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DISAGGREGATING NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
Michael T. Morley* 
Nationwide injunctions have become a focus of heated judicial, academic, and even public debate. Much 
of this analysis treats nationwide injunctions as a unitary concept, referring to a particular type of court 
order. In fact, the term may apply to five different categories of orders of national applicability, each of 
which raises very different constitutional, fairness, rule-based, structural, prudential, and other concerns. 
 
This Article presents a taxonomy of the five types of nationwide injunctions and the proper judicial 
treatment of each. Rather than focusing on the geographic applicability and scope of a court order, injunc-
tions should instead be categorized based on the entities whose rights they seek to enforce and whether the 
case is a class action. Based on these considerations, the proposed taxonomy distinguishes among “na-
tionwide plaintiff-oriented injunctions,” “nationwide plaintiff-class injunctions,” “nationwide associa-
tional injunctions,” “nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions,” and “nationwide private enforcement 
injunctions.” 
 
After presenting this new framework for determining the validity of nationwide injunctions, this Article 
goes on to demonstrate that stare decisis, rather than nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions or even 
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(2), is the most appropriate means 
of protecting the rights of third parties who are not personally involved in litigation. Affording district- or 
circuit-wide stare decisis effect to district court rulings allows members of the public to benefit from them 
and reduces the need for wasteful relitigation. At the same time, this approach recognizes the limited 
authority of lower court judges in our decentralized, hierarchical judiciary; mitigates the effects of extreme 
forum shopping; and ensures some degree of percolation of important constitutional issues. 
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Laycock, Jake Linford, Jonathan Nash, Doug Rendleman, Caprice Roberts, Mark Seidenfeld, Alan Trammell, 
and Hannah Wiseman for comments on this draft. I also deeply appreciate discussions on the subject with 
Samuel Bray, Erwin Chemerinsky, Amanda Frost, and Howard Wasserman. This piece benefited tremen-
dously from feedback and suggestions I received at the Notre Dame Remedies Roundtable, the “Equity in 
the Modern World” panel at the 2019 American Association of Law Schools annual conference, the South-
eastern Junior–Senior Workshop at the University of Georgia School of Law, the fourth annual Civil Proce-
dure Junior Scholars Workshop at Stanford Law School, the tenth annual Federal Courts Junior Scholars 
Workshop at the University of Oklahoma College of Law, the 2018 American Constitution Society Consti-
tutional Law Symposium, the panel entitled “Should One Judge Have All This Power” at the 2018 American 
Association of Law Libraries annual conference, the Federal Courts/Civil Procedure Works-in-Progress 
Workshop at the 2018 Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) annual conference, and the Rem-
edies Discussion Group on “The Law of Equity” at the 2017 SEALS annual conference. I would like to offer 
special thanks to Mary McCormick and Kat Klepfer of the Florida State University College of Law Research 
Center for their tireless assistance. Additionally, I am very grateful for the extraordinary editorial assistance 
of Mazie Bryant and the staff of the Alabama Law Review. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
What exactly does it mean for a court to “strike down” an unconstitutional 
legal provision? Judicial review, as described and applied in Marbury v. Madison,1 
originated as a procedure for resolving certain conflict-of-laws problems that 
arise in the course of adjudicating a case: “[I]f a law be in opposition to the 
constitution . . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules gov-
erns the case. . . . [Because] the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of 
the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case 
to which they both apply.”2 In other words, a court would simply ignore any 
laws it determined violated the Constitution. 
Likewise, when a court determined that a government official acted uncon-
stitutionally, it would decline to recognize that official’s legal authorization or 
governmental status as an affirmative defense in common law suits for damages 
against that official.3 Thus, for approximately the first century of American his-
tory, the primary remedy for a constitutional violation was courts’ refusal to 
give effect to a statute or government action in the case before it.4 A case was 
generally not brought as a constitutional challenge; rather, constitutional ques-
tions would arise in the course of other, nonconstitutional litigation, including 
federal criminal prosecutions, or tort or property suits involving government 
officers.5 
Both the nature of constitutional adjudication and the implications of 
“striking down” a law have fundamentally changed. In the modern era, the ju-
diciary’s role in enforcing the Constitution has expanded to prospectively en-
suring the constitutionality of government conduct by affirmatively preventing 
constitutional violations from occurring ex ante and terminating ongoing ones. 
Congress facilitated this shift by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which 
authorized plaintiffs to sue local and county officials for injunctive relief against 
constitutional violations,6 even when those officials’ actions did not give rise to 
a claim for relief at common law. Such litigation provided a model for analogous 
claims against state7 and federal officials.8 The Administrative Procedure Act 
 
1.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2.  Id. at 178. 
3.  Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court 
Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 146–47 (2012). 
4.  See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1486 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 11–12 (Jack Stark ed., 2002). 
5.  See, e.g., Osborn v. President, Dirs. & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 836–37 (1824); Little v. 
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804). 
6.  Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). 
7.  See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150–60 (1908). 
8.  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220–21 (1882); cf. Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. Co., 
305 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1938) (holding that a litigant properly invoked a federal court’s equity jurisdiction to 
attempt to enjoin the U.S. Attorney from prosecuting it under an allegedly inapplicable statute). 
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(APA) likewise invites courts to grant injunctions against federal agencies that 
act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law.9 
The proliferation of positive federal rights, resulting from both the rise of 
the welfare state and various Warren Court-era rulings,10 bolstered the need for 
more assertive forms of judicial relief to enforce constitutional restrictions and 
requirements. Historically, injunctive relief had been treated as an “extraordi-
nary” remedy.11 As institutional reform litigation, particularly school desegrega-
tion suits, became more frequent, injunctions became commonplace, develop-
ing into the expected remedy in constitutional cases.12 Scholars such as Owen 
Fiss and Abram Chayes hailed courts’ growing use of injunctions as a means of 
enforcing social values.13 
Armed with this new approach to enforcing constitutional limits on gov-
ernmental action, courts have also become increasingly willing to issue various 
types of “nationwide injunctions,” including sweeping orders that completely 
prohibit a government agency or official from enforcing a challenged statute, 
regulation, or policy against anyone, anywhere in the nation. As recently as the 
1980s, nationwide injunctions against government actors were discussed in only 
a handful of opinions. Their frequency picked up somewhat beginning in the 
1990s, reaching a peak in the first year of the Administration of President Don-
ald J. Trump.14 
Over the past few years, federal district courts have entered a series of na-
tionwide injunctions against many of the President’s signature policy initiatives, 
 
9.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
10.  See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (Eighth Amendment right to medical care 
for prisoners); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (procedural due process right to predeprivation 
hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (Fourteenth 
Amendment right to vote regardless of membership in the armed services); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 342–43 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel in noncapital felony prosecutions); see also Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Fourteenth Amendment right to desegregated schools). 
11.  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
12.  OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 13 (1978). 
13.  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1283–88 (1976); 
Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–29 (1979). 
14.  See Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, Remarks Announcing New Memo on National Injunctions (Sept. 13, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-new-
memo-nationwide-injunctions (“Since President Trump took office less than two years ago, he has been hit 
with 25 of these nationwide orders.”). 
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including the travel ban,15 restrictions on transgender people serving in the mil-
itary,16 and the prohibition on federal funds for sanctuary cities.17 Conservative 
litigants likewise obtained similar injunctions against some of President Barack 
Obama’s major policies during his Administration, including his Deferred Ac-
tion for Parents of Aliens (DAPA) program and expansion of his Deferred Ac-
tion for Children of Aliens (DACA) program,18 as well as U.S. Department of 
Education guidelines concerning transgender students’ bathroom usage in 
 
15.  See Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting a nationwide tem-
porary restraining order against the third executive order), partial stay granted, No. 17-17168, 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22725, at *4–5 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2017), stay granted, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (holding that plaintiffs were unlikely 
to succeed in challenging the constitutionality of the executive order); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 631–33 (D. Md. 2017) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction against the 
third executive order), hearing en banc granted, No. 17-2231 (L), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 22168 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 
2017) (en banc), stay granted, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.), aff’d and stay granted, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(en banc), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (remanding for reconsideration 
based on Hawaii), remanded, 905 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2018), dismissed in part, 373 F. Supp. 3d 650 (D. Md. 2019); 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565–66 (D. Md. 2017) (granting a nationwide 
preliminary injunction against the second executive order), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554, 605–06 
(4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. granted and injunction stayed in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017) (per curiam), 
vacated and remanded as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (holding the dispute was moot because the second order 
expired); Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting a nationwide temporary 
restraining order against the second executive order), converted to preliminary injunction, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 
1239 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction against the second executive order), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741, 787–89 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming nationwide scope), injunction 
stayed in part and modified, and cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Proj., 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 
(2017) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (holding the dispute was moot because the 
second order expired); Washington v. Trump, Case No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at *7–
8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting a nationwide temporary restraining order against the first executive 
order), stay denied, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (amended order), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 448 (2017). 
16.  See Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 772 (D. Md. 2017), stay denied, No. MJG-17-2459, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212556 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2017), dissolved, No. GLR-17-2459, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141269, 
at *19 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 2019); Doe v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217 (D.D.C. 2017), rev’d and injunction 
vacated sub nom. Doe v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
17.  See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951–52 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (issuing nationwide 
preliminary injunction against sanctuary city order as applied to Byrne grants), stay denied, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169518, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (affirming decision to issue nationwide injunction), 
aff’d, 888 F.3d 272, 293 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, No. 17-2991, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21801, at 
*3–4 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25694, at *8–9 (7th 
Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (en banc); permanent injunction entered, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (entering nation-
wide permanent injunction against sanctuary city order as applied to Byrne grants, but staying its effects 
outside Illinois), appeal docketed sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, No. 18-2885 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2018); County 
of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting nationwide preliminary injunc-
tion against sanctuary city order), reconsideration denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2017), permanent 
injunction entered, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (issuing nationwide permanent injunction against 
sanctuary city order), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 
1225, 1243–45 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming injunction but narrowing it to apply only within the State of Cali-
fornia); cf. City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 659 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (issuing preliminary 
injunction only requiring the government to pay Byrne grants to the City of Philadelphia), aff’d sub nom. City 
of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 916 F.3d 276, 293 (3d Cir. 2019). 
18.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 & n.111 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), and reh’g denied 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016). 
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schools19 and parts of the Affordable Care Act.20 In late 2018, then-Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum declaring that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice would oppose the issuance of nationwide injunctions against 
federal legal provisions.21 The propriety of nationwide injunctions is truly a 
nonpartisan issue; laws, regulations, and policies favored by either major party 
may be completely invalidated, at least for a time, by a single district judge hand-
picked by plaintiffs, anywhere in the nation. 
A substantial amount of recent scholarship has focused on nationwide in-
junctions. Most of the literature has cautioned against their use,22 though a few 
scholars have defended them.23 This first wave of scholarship concerning na-
tionwide injunctions builds upon earlier work examining class actions against 
 
19.  Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016), appeal dismissed, 679 F. App’x 
320 (5th Cir. 2017). 
20.  Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 14-5018, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099, at *5–6 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, No. 14-5018, 
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16286, at *7 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2015). 
21.  See generally Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions to Heads of Civil Litigating Components 
and U.S. Attorneys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions 
(Sept. 13, 2018); see also Att’y Gen. Sessions, supra note 14. 
22.  See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 418 
(2017) (arguing that nationwide injunctions are not supported by either the traditional equitable principles of 
the English Court of Chancery or the historical practice of American courts); Michael T. Morley, De Facto 
Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional 
Cases, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2016) [hereinafter Morley, De Facto Class Actions?] (arguing that courts 
in public law cases should generally tailor injunctions to enforcing the rights of the plaintiffs before them, 
rather than completely prohibiting the government defendants from enforcing the challenged legal provisions 
against anyone); Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower 
Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017) [hereinafter Morley, Nationwide Injunctions] (arguing that courts should not 
certify nationwide classes under Rule 23(b)(2) in challenges concerning the validity or proper interpretation 
of legal provisions); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017) (arguing that 
nationwide injunctions are inappropriate because relief should be tailored to enforcing the rights of the plain-
tiffs before the court); Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and 
They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018) (arguing that nationwide injunctions violate 
Article III and raise forum-shopping concerns, and that many nationwide injunctions issued against President 
Trump’s initiatives were inappropriate); Getzel Berger, Note, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Govern-
ment: A Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1093–104 (2017) (arguing that, although nationwide 
injunctions are lawful, they are inconsistent with the structure of the federal court system and courts should 
issue circuit-wide injunctions instead); Katherine B. Wheeler, Comment, Why There Should Be a Presumption 
Against Nationwide Injunctions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 200 (2017) (arguing that courts should presumptively decline to 
issue nationwide injunctions and apply special procedural precautions when such relief is necessary). 
23.  See generally, e.g., Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065 (2018) 
(identifying circumstances under which nationwide injunctions are most appropriate); Kate Huddleston, Na-
tionwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F. 242 (2017) (arguing that nationwide injunctions are 
preferable to the alternative of allowing wealthy plaintiffs to take advantage of venue rules to have their cases 
governed by more favorable bodies of precedent); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the 
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56 (2017) (“Although national injunctions are imperfect and 
crude forms of justice, they are better than no justice at all—which for some actions, may be the alternative.”). 
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the government24 and the rise of aggregate claims in nonclass litigation,25 as well 
as the substantial body of literature debating agency nonacquiescence in circuit 
court decisions.26 
Scholars and courts have debated the proper terminology for nationwide 
injunctions, either defending that label27 or suggesting alternatives such as “na-
tional injunction,”28 “defendant-oriented injunction,”29 “universal injunc-
tion,”30 and even “cosmic injunction.”31 Beyond this squabble over terminol-
ogy, however, is a critical point that has been largely overlooked: the concept 
of nationwide injunctions as a they, not an it. Several importantly different types 
of orders have been deemed, or reasonably may be considered, nationwide in-
junctions. Each raises a range of distinct concerns and warrants categorically 
different treatment by courts. Failing to distinguish among the various catego-
ries of nationwide injunctions not only leads to confusion but also causes re-
formers to fail to recognize the full scope of the problem and various permuta-
tions in which it appears. 
This Article offers four main contributions to the literature. First, it dis-
aggregates the concept of nationwide injunction by presenting a taxonomy of the 
different types of orders to which it may refer, exploring the proper judicial 
response to each. This discussion also draws attention to a type of nationwide 
injunction that has previously gone virtually unrecognized: the “nationwide pri-
vate enforcement injunction.” Readers may use this taxonomy as a framework 
for distinguishing among the different types of nationwide injunctions, even if 
 
24.  See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 347, 364 (1988); Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63 
B.U. L. REV. 597, 597–600 (1983). 
25.  See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class 
Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2035 (2015); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 632 (2012); Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A 
Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573, 574, 577, 580 (1981); Daniel J. 
Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1119, 1123–24, 1145–49 (2005). 
26.  Numerous commentators have opposed “intracircuit nonacquiescence,” arguing that federal agen-
cies should follow a circuit court’s precedents within that court’s geographic boundaries, regardless of 
whether an injunction has been issued ordering the agency to do so. See generally, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The 
Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1347 (1991); Matthew Diller & 
Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and 
Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 821–28 (1990). Some scholars, in contrast, argue that intracircuit nonacquiescence 
can be appropriate. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 
98 YALE L.J. 679, 735 (1989); see also Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and 
the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 537 (1986). 
27.  Frost, supra note 23, at 1071. 
28.  Bray, supra note 22, at 419 n.5. 
29.  Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 490. 
30.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); Wasserman, supra 
note 22, at 349. 
31.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); see also 
Josh Blackman, Dueling Cosmic Injunctions, DACA, and Departmentalism, LAWFARE (May 22, 2018, 8:20 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/dueling-cosmic-injunctions-daca-and-departmentalism. 
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they disagree with its normative recommendations concerning the proper treat-
ment of each one.  
Second, this Article contends that the most appropriate mechanism for al-
lowing third-party nonlitigants to be protected by lower courts’ constitutional 
adjudications is stare decisis, rather than any type of nationwide injunction. 
Stare decisis is the vehicle through which U.S. Supreme Court rulings are im-
plemented throughout the nation. District court rulings can similarly be given 
district- or circuit-wide stare decisis effect to protect third parties while respect-
ing both the bounds of Article III and geographic limitations on the scope of 
lower courts’ authority. 
Third, this Article is the first to respond to the recent defenses of nation-
wide injunctions by scholars such as Amanda Frost.32 Finally, this piece goes 
beyond existing critiques of nationwide injunctions by offering a comprehen-
sive analysis of the various ancillary rules and doctrines that must be reformed 
to fully implement any restrictions on such orders. 
Part I of this Article begins by presenting a taxonomy of the five different 
types of nationwide injunctions: (i) nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunctions, (ii) 
nationwide plaintiff-class injunctions, (iii) nationwide associational injunctions, 
(iv) nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, and (v) nationwide private en-
forcement injunctions. Most importantly, this taxonomy suggests that, in non-
class cases, courts should tailor injunctions to enforce only the rights of the 
plaintiffs before the court, and not third-party nonlitigants, as well. In class ac-
tions, courts should certify district- or circuit-wide classes, rather than nation-
wide classes requiring nationwide relief. Because of the problems posed by Rule 
23(b)(2) classes, however, courts should rely primarily on stare decisis rather 
than such class actions to give third-party nonlitigants the benefit of their con-
stitutional and other public law rulings. And courts should ensure that plaintiff 
entities do not use associational standing to bring de facto class actions outside 
the context of Rule 23 to obtain backdoor nationwide injunctions.   
Part II delves into the range of other doctrines that must be reconsidered 
or modified to fully implement the necessary restrictions on nationwide injunc-
tions. In particular, federal agencies should adopt a policy of intracircuit acqui-
escence—giving legal effect in administrative proceedings to courts of appeals’ 
rulings in matters subject to judicial review within their respective circuits. In 
addition, federal courts must abandon the “necessity doctrine,” which allows 
them to deny requests for class certification in public law cases on the ground 
that certification would not affect the scope of available relief. Federal courts 
should likewise reject the “one good plaintiff” rule, which allows a court to 
adjudicate a public law case after confirming that only a single plaintiff has 
standing, rather than assessing the standing of each plaintiff. Finally, Congress 
 
32.  See Frost, supra note 23. 
1 MORLEY 1-65 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019  8:31 PM 
2019] Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions 9 
must reassess federal venue statutes to determine the circumstances under 
which plaintiffs from across the nation should be able to file constitutional and 
other public law cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
potentially allowing that court and the D.C. Circuit to give their rulings the force 
of law across the entire nation (as they already do in many administrative law 
matters). Part III briefly concludes. 
I. A TAXONOMY OF NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
The term nationwide injunction is not defined in the U.S. Code, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or Supreme Court precedent. As mentioned earlier, 
commentators cannot even agree that nationwide injunction is the proper ter-
minology for the orders they wish to discuss.33 
Nationwide injunction is best understood as referring not to a single type 
of order, but rather a family of different types of orders with nationwide ap-
plicability. As the following taxonomy demonstrates, even that definition of na-
tionwide injunction is misleading because many of these orders may apply even 
beyond the nation’s geographic boundaries, around the world. The main distin-
guishing characteristic among the different categories of nationwide injunctions 
are the particular people or entities whose rights they are tailored to enforce 
and the nature of the plaintiff or plaintiffs bringing the case. Each category of 
nationwide injunctions raises different constitutional, fairness-related, rule-
based, structural, and prudential concerns, and, accordingly, should be treated 
differently by the courts. 
The concept of nationwide injunction encompasses the following five dis-
tinct categories of orders, which this Part discusses in turn: 
(i) Nationwide Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction—an order in a nonclass 
case prohibiting the defendant34 from enforcing a challenged statute, regulation, 
order, policy, or other issuance (collectively, “legal provision”) against the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs before the court—either individuals, or entities asserting organ-
izational standing35—regardless of where in the nation (or potentially even the 
world) such violations occur. Plaintiff-oriented injunctions are presumptively 
the proper type of injunctive relief; nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunctions are 
 
33.  See supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
34.  Throughout this Article, unless context dictates otherwise, “defendant” should be understood as 
referring not only to the enjoined party itself but also its agent and privies, as well as other third-party non-
litigants who have received notice of the injunction and are acting in concert with any of those entities. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). 
35.  An entity asserts organizational standing when it asserts its own rights as an entity, distinct from 
the rights of its members. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982); Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977). 
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valid when the plaintiff satisfies the legality, standing, and threat constraints 
(discussed below).36 
(ii) Nationwide Plaintiff-Class Injunction—an order prohibiting the 
defendant from enforcing a challenged legal provision against any members of 
a plaintiff class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) that includes all right holders across 
the nation (or potentially even the world). Nationwide plaintiff-class injunctions 
are a valid form of relief when the court has certified a nationwide class, but 
courts should typically certify only district- or circuit-wide classes in challenges 
to federal legal provisions. More broadly, courts should rely on stare decisis 
rather than plaintiff-class injunctions under Rule 23(b)(2) as their primary 
mechanism for ensuring that rulings in constitutional and other public law cases 
protect right holders other than the named plaintiffs in a case. 
(iii) Nationwide Associational Injunction—an order in a case brought 
by a plaintiff entity asserting associational standing on behalf of its members 
that prohibits the defendant from enforcing a challenged legal provision against 
anyone, anywhere in the nation (or potentially even the world). Courts should 
not issue nationwide associational injunctions. When an entity asserts associa-
tional standing to enforce its members’ rights, those members (as of the date of 
judgment) are the real parties in interest, and the court should enter a plaintiff-
oriented injunction in favor of those individuals. 
(iv) Nationwide Defendant-Oriented Injunction—an order in a non-
class case brought by individuals or entities asserting organizational standing 
that prohibits the defendant from enforcing a challenged legal provision against 
anyone, anywhere in the nation (or potentially even the world), including third-
party nonlitigants. Courts should not issue nationwide defendant-oriented in-
junctions. When a case involves indivisible rights, in which it is impossible to 
enforce the rights of the plaintiff before the court without thereby also enforc-
ing others’ rights as well, a valid plaintiff-oriented injunction will resemble a 
nationwide defendant-oriented injunction. 
(v) Nationwide Private Enforcement Injunction—an order attempting 
to prohibit all potential plaintiffs throughout the nation (or potentially even the 
world) from bringing a private right of action under a federal legal provision 
against a particular person or entity. Nationwide private enforcement injunc-
tions are likely precluded under current law. Courts should consider developing 
some mechanism to allow an individual or entity to bring an effective pre-en-
forcement challenge against federal legal provisions that create private rights of 
action. 
 
36.  See infra Part I.A. 
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 This Part discusses each of these categories of nationwide injunction in 
turn. 
A. Plaintiff-Oriented Injunctions 
A plaintiff-oriented injunction is an order tailored to enforcing the rights 
of the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs before the court, without unnecessarily 
extending it further to protect the rights of third-party nonlitigants, as well.37 
Plaintiff-oriented injunctions are the presumptively proper form of relief in 
nonclass cases.38 As discussed below, the geographic breadth of a plaintiff-ori-
ented injunction is determined by the scope of the plaintiff’s rights. The court 
may restrict the defendant’s behavior—as well as the behavior of third parties 
acting in concert with the defendant who receive notice of the injunction39—
anywhere in the nation, including outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction, as 
needed to protect the plaintiff’s rights.40 When a court enters a plaintiff-oriented 
injunction in a constitutional challenge or other public law case, the government 
defendants generally may continue enforcing the challenged legal provision 
against other people. 
Occasionally, the right at issue in a lawsuit will be indivisible; the nature of 
the dispute makes it impossible for the government to enforce just the plain-
tiff’s rights without simultaneously enforcing third-party nonlitigants’ rights as 
well.41 For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause 
 
37.  An injunction may be “prohibitory” or “mandatory.” A prohibitory injunction bars the defendant 
from engaging in certain specified acts, while a mandatory injunction compels the defendant to affirmatively 
perform certain acts. Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1061 (1965). Semantically, 
most injunctions may be written in either mandatory or prohibitory terms. See Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban 
Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995). 
38.  See DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION 167 (3d ed. 2018); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Bal-
ancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 694 (1988); see also Bray, supra note 22, at 469; 
Siddique, supra note 22, at 2100–01 (“[T]he geographic scope of an injunction often is, and always should be, 
limited to only what is ‘necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979))). 
39.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (1897). 
40.  Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 451 (1932) (holding that an injunction 
binds the respondent personally and may “operate[] continuously and perpetually upon the respondent in 
relation to the prohibited conduct . . . throughout the United States” and not just within the judicial district 
in which it was issued); see, e.g., Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The mandate 
of an injunction issued by a federal district court runs nationwide . . . . A court may therefore hold an enjoined 
party in contempt, regardless of the state in which the person violates the court’s orders.” (citation omitted)). 
41.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Indivisible 
remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter determines the 
application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants.”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (defining indivisibility as “the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined 
or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them” (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, 
Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009))). 
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forbids the government from directly subsidizing sectarian educational activi-
ties.42 When a law or regulation violates the Establishment Clause by impermis-
sibly subsidizing religious education, courts have approved nationwide injunc-
tions completely prohibiting the government from implementing those 
provisions.43 In one such case, the court refused to certify a plaintiff class on 
the grounds that, “[b]y its very nature[,] the relief ordered will benefit the pro-
posed class, whether or not it is certified as such.”44 Because the rights at issue 
were indivisible, enforcing the plaintiffs’ rights under the Establishment Clause 
unavoidably enforced third parties’ rights, as well.  
The proper geographic scope of a plaintiff-oriented injunction depends on 
three related factors: the legality constraint, the standing constraint, and the 
threat constraint. First, the legality constraint permits a court to extend an in-
junction only to geographic regions where the enjoined conduct would violate, 
or facilitate violation of, the plaintiff’s rights. For example, a court will generally 
enjoin a defendant from using a plaintiff’s descriptive trademark only in geo-
graphic regions in which the mark has acquired secondary meaning.45 Likewise, 
a plaintiff may not enjoin competitors from using a registered mark in places 
where those competitors had continuously used the mark prior to its registra-
tion.46 In such cases, nationwide injunctions completely prohibiting a defendant 
from using the marks at issue are generally deemed inappropriate. 
The legality constraint plays a particularly important role in federal diversity 
cases arising under state law because the conduct at issue may be illegal in some 
states yet permitted in others. Laws such as Illinois’s antidilution statute47 pro-
hibit conduct that other states allow, or at least refrain from regulating. A na-
tionwide injunction against violating such state statutes—even when the statute 
 
42.  See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971). 
43.  See, e.g., Decker v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 473 F. Supp. 770, 772, 774, 779 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (entering 
a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the U.S. Department of Labor from awarding grants or con-
tracts under Title II of the Comprehensive Employment Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 841–45 (repealed 
1982), “to religious institutions for the employment of teachers and other staff for parochial schools”), recon-
sideration denied, 485 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Decker v. O’Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 618 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (affirming nationwide scope of injunction because the court’s analysis “relied primarily on the 
statute and regulation” rather than evidence about particular grant recipients). 
44.  Decker, 485 F. Supp. at 844; see infra Part II.D.2. 
45.  Int’l Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 662, 665 (M.D. Fla. 1964); see also Conan 
Props. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 155 (5th Cir. 1985); cf. Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 
1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s decision to “limit[] the scope of the injunction to Ari-
zona” rather than granting nationwide relief because “[c]ourts should not enjoin conduct that has not been 
found to violate any law. Injunctive relief under the Lanham Act must be narrowly tailored to the scope of 
the issues tried in the case.” (citations omitted)). 
46.  Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1397, 1403 (3d Cir. 1985); see also 
What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 446–47 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1115(b)(5)) 
47.  765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1036/65 (2017). 
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itself purports to authorize such relief—is problematic.48 Of course, the legality 
constraint does not require that the enjoined conduct actually be illegal. Courts 
may issue prophylactic injunctions that bar defendants from engaging in other-
wise permissible conduct when reasonably necessary to fully enforce a plain-
tiff’s rights.49 A state generally may not prohibit a defendant from engaging in 
conduct outside its borders, however, simply to bolster the efficacy of its inter-
nal regulations50 or even protect its residents when they travel to, or do business 
in, other states.51 
Second, the standing constraint focuses on the plaintiff’s conduct. It per-
mits a court to extend an injunction to any region in which the plaintiff engages 
in activity that places it at some risk of harm from the defendant. A court gen-
erally will not extend an injunction to areas in which a plaintiff is not present 
and has no connection, such as by traveling, doing business, engaging in adver-
tising, or owning property there.52 
 
48.  See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 382–83 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (issuing a nation-
wide injunction prohibiting the defendant from violating Illinois’s antidilution statute but staying its applica-
bility to conduct in other states); see also Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., No. 94 Civ. 2322 (DLC), 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2278, at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1995) (issuing a permanent injunction “limited to the con-
fines of New York State” prohibiting the defendant from violating New York’s antidilution statute); cf. In-
structional Sys. v. Comput. Curriculum Corp., 826 F. Supp. 831, 852 (D.N.J. 1993) (refusing to issue nation-
wide injunction under New Jersey’s Franchise Practices Act), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 35 F.3d 813 (3d Cir. 
1994). Enforcing a state statute against conduct beyond that state’s borders may violate the Dormant Com-
merce Clause as well. Hyatt, 610 F. Supp. at 383 (“[T]he court believes there to be a conflict between an 
interpretation of the anti-dilution law which allows for a nationwide injunction and the commerce clause of 
the United States Constitution.”); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion); 
cf. Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Greenberg, No. 93-55535, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 17313, at *6–7 (9th Cir. July 
3, 1995) (holding that it would be unconstitutional to “use a state statute to impose a nationwide permanent 
injunction . . . to directly regulate interstate commerce”). 
49.  See Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad 
Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 101, 115 (2004). 
50.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (“A State cannot punish 
a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.”); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 
149, 161 (1914) (“[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdic-
tion of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted 
within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the 
Constitution depends.”); Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909) (“[O]ne State cannot enforce its opin-
ion against that of the other . . . as to an act done within the limits of that other State.”); Huntington v. Attrill, 
146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (“Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which 
enacts them, and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States.”); see also Healy v. Beer 
Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (“[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the 
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of 
whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.”); FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 
362 U.S. 293, 302 (1960) (noting “the impediments, contingencies, and doubts which constitutional limita-
tions might create as to Nebraska’s power to regulate any given aspect of extraterritorial activity”). 
51.  See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) (“A State does not acquire power or supervision 
over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be 
affected when they travel to that State.”). 
52.  See, e.g., Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 303, 314 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying 
a nationwide injunction because “plaintiff has not established that it has significantly promoted its marks in 
any market other than in Massachusetts”); Allan J. Richardson & Assocs., Inc. v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 
1 MORLEY 1-65 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019  8:31 PM 
14 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1:1 
This standing constraint may arise from three different sources: the Con-
stitution, the underlying statute (in statutory causes of action), and traditional 
equitable principles. Most basically, a plaintiff lacks standing under Article III 
of the Constitution to seek an injunction restricting a defendant’s conduct—
including illegal conduct—in geographic areas in which such conduct would 
not harm it.53 Some statutes further limit the scope of injunctive relief a court 
may issue. For example, the Clayton Act permits a plaintiff to seek an injunction 
“against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.”54 Its 
plain text permits a court to enjoin only conduct that poses a risk of inflicting 
“loss or damage” on the plaintiff.55 If a plaintiff neither does business nor has 
concrete plans to do business in a particular state or part of the country, then a 
defendant’s anticompetitive behavior in those regions generally would not 
cause a risk of loss to the plaintiff and may not be enjoined. Finally, traditional 
equitable principles counsel that a court should tailor each remedy to the scope 
of the violation at issue.56 
In an unfair competition case, for example, a plaintiff that “enjoys a nation-
wide reputation” fulfills the standing constraint for seeking a nationwide injunc-
tion against the defendant.57 Likewise, when the government obtains an injunc-
tion prohibiting private parties from violating the law, it also generally has 
standing to seek nationwide relief.58 Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM 
Corp. is a clear example of the standing constraint in action.59 The district court 
held that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against the defendant’s anti-
trust violations.60 Although the plaintiff had sought a nationwide injunction, the 
court entered an order prohibiting the defendant from entering into illegal tying 
agreements only in the state of Maryland.61 That was “the only state where 
plaintiff [was] franchised to sell [competing] paper, where almost all of its sales 
[were] made, and the only state where it [had] suffered or [was] threatened with 
 
835–36 (Tex. App. 1986) (affirming a preliminary injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete only within 
the five states in which the former employee’s office actually did business). 
53.  See infra notes 149–51. 
54.  15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012). 
55.  Id. 
56.  See supra note 38. 
57.  Accu Pers., Inc. v. Accustaff, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1161, 1172 (D. Del. 1993) (“As plaintiff seeks an 
injunction national in scope, it must demonstrate market penetration of a national scope.”); Allen v. Nat’l 
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586, 597 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1987) (“National advertising is arguably sufficient to support a nationwide injunction even in the ab-
sence of the junior user’s bad faith.”). 
58.  See, e.g., United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 756 F.2d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 1985). 
59.  287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968). 
60.  Id. at 159. 
61.  Id. at 159–60. 
1 MORLEY 1-65 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019  8:31 PM 
2019] Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions 15 
loss or damage by [the defendant’s] violation of the antitrust laws.”62 The plain-
tiff’s lack of paper sales outside of Maryland precluded it from asserting stand-
ing to enjoin the defendant’s anticompetitive behavior elsewhere.63 
Finally, the threat constraint focuses on the geographic extent of the de-
fendant’s behavior. It counsels courts to extend injunctions only to geographic 
areas in which a defendant’s past or likely future conduct poses a risk of violat-
ing the plaintiff’s rights.64 A court generally may not extend an injunction to a 
particular region as a purely prophylactic matter, prohibiting a defendant from 
acting illegally in areas where there is no reason to believe it has violated, or is 
reasonably likely to violate, the law.65 
The threat constraint is simply a corollary of the broader equitable principle 
that a court may only “restrain acts [that] are of the same type or class” as the 
defendant was found to have committed or is likely to commit.66 The fact that 
the defendant has violated a statute in a particular place or manner “does not 
justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant 
to contempt proceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit some new 
violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was originally charged.”67 
Under the threat constraint, a nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunction is per-
missible only where a defendant has engaged, or is likely to engage, in illegal 
action on a nationwide basis.68 
The threat constraint frequently plays an important role in limiting the 
scope of injunctive relief when a company operates retail stores across the na-
tion and a court finds that practices at a particular store violate the law. While 
a court will enjoin the company from violating the underlying statute at the 
location at issue in the future, it generally will not extend the injunction nation-
wide to other states and locations in which the company has not been found to 
have acted illegally.69 When a company’s operations are primarily controlled 
 
62.  Id. at 159. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Five Platters, Inc. v Purdie, 419 F. Supp. 372, 384 (D. Md. 1976) (“In view of the peripatetic nature 
of the two singing groups involved, the injunction should be nationwide in scope.”). 
65.  See, e.g., United States v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org., 524 F. Supp. 160, 163 (D.D.C. 1981) 
(“Plaintiffs’ showing falls far short of the irreparable injury necessary to support a nationwide injunction of 
the kind requested here.”); cf. Thomas, supra note 49, at 131. 
66.  NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435 (1941). 
67.  Id. at 435–36. 
68.  Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[D]efendants advertised a 
nationally franchised business through a national magazine. The harm sought to be prevented is clearly not 
limited to the New York area, and the injunction must therefore be national in scope.”); Ross v. Smith (In re 
Gavin), 181 B.R. 814, 825 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (imposing a nationwide injunction because, while the fraud-
ulent bankruptcy preparer “intends to terminate its Philadelphia operations . . . it has no intention of discon-
tinuing its bankruptcy operations in California or possibly elsewhere”). 
69.  Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 734–35 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
where an ADEA violation arose from the behavior of a single employee in a single store and there was no 
evidence of a “discriminatory company policy,” the district court erred in “enjoining appellant nationwide”); 
Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[A]bsent a showing of a policy of 
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from its main headquarters, in contrast, courts are more willing to find a threat 
of future violations throughout all of its locations and are accordingly more 
willing to grant nationwide injunctions.70 
Thus, courts adjudicating nonclass cases should issue plaintiff-oriented in-
junctions aimed at enforcing and preventing violations of the plaintiffs’ rights. 
The proper geographic scope of a plaintiff-oriented injunction is a function of 
three considerations: the legality constraint, the standing constraint, and the 
threat constraint. When these requirements are satisfied, a court may enter an 
injunction prohibiting the defendant from violating the plaintiffs’ rights any-
where in the nation or even the world. 
In a challenge concerning the validity or meaning of a federal legal provi-
sion, a court may issue a nationwide injunction prohibiting the government de-
fendants from violating the rights of the plaintiffs before it anywhere in the 
nation when those plaintiffs face a more-than-speculative possibility of harm 
on a nationwide basis. The threat constraint will almost always be satisfied in 
such cases since the federal government operates on a national basis. 
Similarly, the legality constraint will also almost always be satisfied nation-
ally since the U.S. Constitution and federal laws generally apply equally across 
the nation. One might object that the Supreme Court has recognized the pre-
rogative of each circuit to adopt varying interpretations of the Constitution and 
federal laws (subject to the Court’s ultimate review).71 Once a federal court has 
adjudicated a constitutional or legal issue between a plaintiff and the govern-
ment, however, that ruling is generally binding on both parties as a matter of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel in all other courts throughout the nation, 
including jurisdictions that otherwise might have resolved the issue differ-
ently.72 
The primary obstacle to a nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunction against 
the government in a public law case will typically be the standing constraint. If 
a plaintiff does not face a realistic likelihood of living, working, or traveling 
beyond a certain geographic area, a court generally may not issue a prophylactic 
nationwide injunction regulating the government’s conduct throughout the rest 
 
discrimination which extends beyond the plants at issue here, there is no basis for a nationwide injunction.”); 
Marshall v. J. C. Penney Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1195 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (“The Court cannot entertain a 
request for a nationwide injunction without evidence first, that similar wage differentials exist between males 
and females within the same job classification in other Penney stores . . . .”), amended by No. C73-530, 1979 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13512 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 1979); Brennan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F. Supp. 84, 101 
(N.D. Iowa 1976) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to “have the Court infer present and future nationwide viola-
tions of the Equal Pay Act from the existence of present and future violations in Fort Dodge”). 
70.  See Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 449–50 (5th Cir. 1973). 
71.  See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900). 
72.  See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1979) (“Because we find that the constitu-
tional question presented by this appeal was determined adversely to the United States in a prior state pro-
ceeding, we reverse on grounds of collateral estoppel without reaching the merits.”). The Supreme Court has 
generally prohibited third-party nonlitigants from invoking nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against 
the government, however. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
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of the nation. Courts seldom expressly consider the geographic applicability of 
plaintiff-oriented injunctions, however, and instead simply prohibit the govern-
ment from applying the challenged legal provision to the plaintiffs without 
specifying any geographic constraints or restrictions.73 Even when a court limits 
an injunction’s geographic applicability, if a plaintiff’s circumstances change and 
it starts facing a risk of harm in a different part of the country, it can always 
petition the court to modify the injunction.74 Thus, when necessary to protect 
a plaintiff’s rights, a court may issue a nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunction 
prohibiting the government from enforcing a challenged legal provision against 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs in the case before it, anywhere in the nation. 
B. Plaintiff-Class Injunctions and Rule 23(b)(2) 
A second type of nationwide injunction is the nationwide plaintiff-class in-
junction. Such an order prohibits the government from applying a challenged 
legal provision against any members of a nationwide plaintiff class certified un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).75 Rule 23(b)(2) permits a court to 
certify a class whenever the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief” for the class is 
“appropriate.”76 
As discussed above, traditional equitable principles dictate that a court 
should tailor injunctive relief to enforce the rights of the plaintiff or plaintiffs 
before it.77 Under this principle, when a court certifies a plaintiff class, any in-
junction should be tailored to enforce the rights of those class members. Ac-
cordingly, when a court certifies a nationwide class of all right holders adversely 
affected by a challenged legal provision, the appropriate remedy is a nationwide 
plaintiff-class injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing that pro-
vision against any class member, anywhere in the nation. The main issue in such 
cases is not the appropriate scope of injunctive relief, but rather the proper 
scope of the underlying class.78 
Approximately a half-century ago, in Califano v. Yakisaki, the Supreme 
Court held that district courts may certify nationwide classes in lawsuits against 
agency officials concerning federal legal provisions.79 The Court’s analysis was 
 
73.  See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 510–14 (collecting cases). 
74.  See Sys. Fed’n No. 91 Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (“[A] sound judicial 
discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of 
law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen.”); see also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (authorizing a court to modify a judgment when “applying it prospectively is no longer 
equitable”). 
      75.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
76.  Id. 
77.  See supra note 38 (citing sources). 
78.  See Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 22, at 646–47. 
79.  442 U.S. at 702. 
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brief. It explained that neither Rule 23 nor “principles of equity jurisprudence” 
limit “the geographical scope of a class action.”80 The proper scope of a class, 
and therefore injunctive relief, “is dictated by the extent of the violation estab-
lished, not by [its] geographical extent.”81 
Notwithstanding Califano, courts should generally certify only district- and 
circuit-wide classes rather than nationwide classes under Rule 23(b)(2) in con-
stitutional and other public law cases against government defendants, thereby 
obviating the need to issue nationwide plaintiff-class injunctions. A few years 
after Califano, the Supreme Court issued United States v. Mendoza, in which it 
generally prohibited plaintiffs from asserting offensive nonmutual collateral es-
toppel against the government.82 In other words, after one plaintiff receives a 
favorable district court ruling on a legal issue, an unrelated plaintiff may not 
claim the benefit of that ruling in unrelated litigation. Rather, the government 
is free to relitigate the same issue in other cases against other plaintiffs.83 A 
nationwide class under Califano precludes relitigation of important legal issues 
to the same extent as the offensive collateral estoppel prohibited by Mendoza. 
Mendoza’s rejection of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the gov-
ernment undermines Califano’s endorsement of nationwide plaintiff classes 
against the government.84 
Additionally, rejecting nationwide classes allows important issues to perco-
late in the lower courts, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to assess the 
consequences of different circuits’ competing approaches.85 Likewise, if a na-
tionwide injunction completely nullifying a federal legal provision is affirmed 
by a circuit court, the Supreme Court is essentially compelled to hear the case.86 
It becomes much more difficult for the Court to exercise its passive virtues by 
allowing controversial issues to further develop, become less politically charged, 
or get resolved through political means.87 Moreover, the Court must adjudicate 
the issue based on the fact pattern of the case in which the nationwide injunc-
tion was granted, rather than waiting and granting certiorari when the issue is 
presented in a cleaner context facilitating easier and more accurate adjudication. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, nationwide plaintiff classes and the 
resulting nationwide plaintiff-class injunctions are inconsistent with the struc-
ture of the federal judicial system.88 Congress structured the federal judiciary in 
 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  464 U.S. 154, 155 (1984). 
83.  Id. at 162 (“[N]onmutual offensive collateral estoppel simply does not apply against the Govern-
ment in such a way as to preclude relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
84.  See Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 22, at 637–43. 
85.  Id. at 643; cf. Bray, supra note 22, at 461–62. 
86.  Bray, supra note 22, at 461–62; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 22, at 639–43. 
87.  See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 116, 176 (2d ed. 1986). 
88.  Bray, supra note 22, at 465; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 22, at 647–53. 
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a decentralized, hierarchical manner, designating limited geographic regions in 
which lower courts may exercise jurisdiction over people89 and in which their 
legal opinions have the force of law.90 Allowing district courts to certify nation-
wide classes in constitutional and other public law challenges against the gov-
ernment allows them to impose their view of the law throughout the nation. 
They may apply their conclusions to right holders outside their geographic ju-
risdiction, whose claims would otherwise be governed by other circuits’ prece-
dent. 
Putting aside the proper scope of a class, Rule 23(b)(2) is a poor mechanism 
for determining whether a court’s rulings should protect right holders other 
than the named plaintiffs in a case, for three main reasons. First, the Supreme 
Court, in arguable dicta—along with some commentators—has asserted that 
Rule 23(b)(2) allows for class certification only to protect indivisible rights. As 
explained earlier, a right is indivisible if it is impossible to protect that right for 
only a particular plaintiff without also thereby enforcing the rights of third par-
ties.91 The classic example is legislative redistricting. If a court concludes that a 
particular legislative district is unconstitutionally or illegally drawn, it must order 
a new district for all voters. It cannot mandate a new district just for the plaintiff 
in the case while retaining the previous district for all other voters in the area. 
In arguable dicta in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court, quot-
ing Professor Richard Nagareda, stated that “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the 
indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the no-
tion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only 
as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’”92 The Court elaborated, 
“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment 
would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class 
certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different 
injunction.”93 The Court later cited Wal-Mart in the 2018 case Jennings v. Rodri-
guez as its basis for directing the court of appeals to reconsider the propriety of 
certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class to challenge the constitutionality of laws author-
izing detention of undocumented immigrants.94 Professor Maureen Carroll, ac-
cepting Wal-Mart’s indivisibility requirement, has suggested ways of attempting 
to understand and apply it.95 
 
89.  Cf. Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) (“The Judiciary Act has divided the United 
States into judicial districts. . . . The circuit court of each district sits within and for that district, and is 
bounded by its local limits. Whatever may be the extent of their jurisdiction over the subject matter of suits, 
in respect to persons and property, it can only be exercised within the limits of the district.”). 
90.  See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) (stating that one circuit’s 
legal conclusions are not binding on other circuits). 
91.  See supra note 41 (citing sources). 
92.  564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 41, at 131). 
93.  Id. 
94.  138 S. Ct. 830, 851–52 (2018). 
95.  See generally Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59 (2019). 
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It is far from certain whether the Wal-Mart Court was correct in inferring 
that Rule 23(b)(2) classes are permissible only in cases involving indivisible 
rights. It is similarly unclear how broadly any such requirement applies and what 
exactly it demands. The text of Rule 23(b)(2) contains no such “indivisibility” 
requirement.96 The rule was adopted to facilitate civil rights litigation in which 
numerous people suffer from the same type of discrimination.97 Incorporating 
an indivisibility requirement could seriously frustrate these goals in many con-
texts. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart wished to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class 
to seek backpay, which would have required individualized monetary payments 
to each class member.98 As the Court emphasized, “individualized monetary 
claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3),” which contains additional procedural protec-
tions for class members that do not apply in the Rule 23(b)(2) context.99 The 
Court might be more accepting of a prohibitory injunction ordering a defendant 
to cease discriminating against (or otherwise violating the rights of) a class of 
plaintiffs. Unlike with claims for monetary relief, there is no alternate provision 
within Rule 23 that would provide a superior vehicle for litigating such claims 
on a class-wide basis. 
Additionally, the Wal-Mart Court held that class certification is appropriate 
under Rule 23(b)(2) when an injunction could “provide relief to each member 
of the class” without requiring each member to receive “a different injunc-
tion.”100 When a legal provision violates multiple plaintiffs’ rights, a single in-
junction prohibiting the defendant agency or official from enforcing that pro-
vision against any class member can remedy the harm. Even if the class 
members’ rights are divisible, and it would be conceptually possible to enforce 
only the named plaintiffs’ rights without necessarily enforcing others’ rights as 
well, an injunction completely barring enforcement of the challenged provision 
would provide class-wide relief. 
Wal-Mart also may be read as incorporating an unusually broad definition 
of indivisibility.101 Generally, a right is deemed divisible if it is possible to en-
 
96.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
97.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1964 amendment; see also 7AA CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1776, at 83–84 (3d ed. 2005) (“[S]ubdivision 
(b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 in part to make it clear that civil-rights suits for injunctive or declaratory 
relief can be brought as class actions. . . . [T]he class suit is a uniquely appropriate procedure in civil-rights 
cases . . . .”). 
98.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360 (“We also conclude that respondents’ claims for backpay were improp-
erly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).”). 
99.  Id. at 362. As discussed below, Rule 23(b)(2) does not require members of a putative class to be 
afforded either notice of the lawsuit or an opportunity to opt out. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
100.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360 (emphasis omitted). 
101.  Cf. Carroll, supra note 95, at 63–64. 
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force it for some right holders and not others, and indivisible if it can be en-
forced only on an all-or-nothing, everyone-or-no-one basis.102 The Wal-Mart 
Court, however, may have been using the term in a different, broader sense. At 
several points, the Court explained that Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class certifica-
tion where an injunction could “provide relief to each member of the class”103 
and the relief would “affect the entire class at once, . . . benefiting all its mem-
bers at once.”104 An injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing a 
challenged legal provision against members of a plaintiff class would satisfy that 
requirement, benefiting each class member without requiring further individu-
alized treatment such as monetary payments.105 
Thus, it is reasonably debatable whether Rule 23(b)(2) actually contains a 
broad, generally applicable indivisibility requirement. Wal-Mart may be read as 
imposing such a requirement only for classes seeking injunctions ordering mon-
etary relief.106 Moreover, the Wal-Mart Court may have adopted an unusually 
broad definition of indivisibility, preserving the availability of Rule 23(b)(2) clas-
ses in most constitutional and other public law challenges against the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, several circuits have invoked Wal-Mart to reject Rule 
23(b)(2) classes on indivisibility grounds even when the plaintiffs did not seek 
monetary relief,107 calling into question the availability of such classes as a 
means of protecting divisible rights.   
A second major reason why Rule 23(b)(2) classes are problematic as a 
means of protecting rights on a class-wide basis is that class members might not 
be bound by unfavorable rulings. One of the main functions of a class action is 
to bind class members to the court’s judgment as a matter of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. In a challenge to the validity or meaning of a legal provision, 
if the plaintiffs win, all class members receive the benefit of the court’s judg-
ment and any resulting injunction.108 Conversely, if the government prevails, 
 
102.  See supra note 41 (citing sources). 
103.  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. 
104.  Id. at 362. 
105.  See, e.g., Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 367–68 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming certification of Rule 
23(b)(2) class where “the same action/inaction by Defendants is the source of any injury for the entire Gen-
eral Class”); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 687–88 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding, post-Wal-Mart, that Rule 
23(b)(2)’s “requirements are unquestionably satisfied when members of a putative class seek uniform injunc-
tive or declaratory relief from policies or practices that are generally applicable to the class as a whole”). 
106.  Courts have already applied Wal-Mart to reject Rule 23(b)(2) classes for monetary damages. See, 
e.g., W. Morgan-E. Lawrence Water & Sewer Auth. v. 3M Co., 737 F. App’x 457, 469 (11th Cir. 2018) (per 
curiam). 
107.  See, e.g., Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Astrellas U.S., LLC, 763 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 
2014); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 498–99 (7th Cir. 2012). 
108.   See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (citing Supreme Tribe 
of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921)). 
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res judicata should preclude any class member from relitigating the same issue 
in any other court.109 
The Supreme Court has held, however, that at least in the context of claims 
for monetary damages, res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to class 
members unless they receive notice of the action, affording them an oppor-
tunity to attempt to participate in the case or opt out.110 The Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses preclude courts from adjudicating 
class members’ claims for monetary relief in the absence of those minimal pro-
cedural protections.111 The Court has not yet addressed, however, whether no-
tice and opt-out requirements apply to members of Rule 23(b)(2) classes.112 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that members of Rule 
23(b)(2) classes are not necessarily entitled to receive either notice of the lawsuit 
or an opportunity to opt out.113 And lower courts have held that the difficulty 
or even impossibility of ascertaining, much less contacting, members of a Rule 
23(b)(2) class does not preclude class certification.114 Even if district courts 
wished to require class representatives to provide notice and an opportunity to 
opt out to members of putative Rule 23(b)(2) classes, it would often be imprac-
ticable or impossible to do so. In challenges to legal provisions, courts typically 
define Rule 23(b)(2) classes in terms of all people who are, or at some point in 
 
109.  Id.; see also Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (recognizing that it would 
be “unfair to allow members of a class to benefit from a favorable judgment without subjecting themselves 
to the binding effect of an unfavorable one”). 
110.  Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
111.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 349 (2011) (“For a class-action money judg-
ment to bind absentees in litigation, . . . absent [class] members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to 
be heard, and a right to opt out of the class.”); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (holding, 
in a case involving a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, that “mandatory class actions aggregating damages claims” are 
subject to the due process restriction “that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which 
he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process” (quoting 
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40)); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[D]ue process 
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the 
class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.”). 
112.  Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3 (limiting notice and opt-out requirements to “class actions which seek 
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments,” and “intimat[ing] 
no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief”). 
113.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (authorizing members of classes 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) to “request[] exclusion” from the lawsuit); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (“The Rule provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members to opt out, 
and does not even oblige the District Court to afford them notice of the action.”). 
114.  See, e.g., Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The nature of Rule 23(b)(2) actions, 
the Advisory Committee’s note on (b)(2) actions, and the practice of many . . . other federal courts all lead us 
to conclude that ascertainability is not a requirement for certification of [a Rule 23(b)(2)] class seeking only 
injunctive and declaratory relief . . . .”); Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir. 2004); Yaffe 
v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972); DL v. District of Columbia, 302 F.R.D. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(“[T]he rationale for precise ascertainability is inapposite in the [Rule] 23(b)(2) context . . . .”); Floyd v. City 
of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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the future will be, adversely affected by those provisions. This includes individ-
uals who currently lack standing, whose claims are not yet ripe, and who may 
not even exist yet.  
For example, in Brown v. Plata, classes of prisoners with “serious mental 
disorders” and “serious medical conditions” challenged prison overcrowding in 
California.115 The Supreme Court held that the relief had to include both cur-
rent and potential future class members and could not be limited only to current 
prisoners.116 Likewise, in a case challenging racial profiling, a district court cer-
tified a Rule 23(b)(2) class consisting of “all individuals who travel or will travel 
I-95” through a certain town.117 In challenges to the constitutionality of an 
abortion statute, the plaintiff class often will not just include pregnant women 
who are seeking an abortion in violation of the statute’s restrictions, but also 
any women who may become pregnant and be burdened by the statute at some 
point in the future.118  
The inclusion of class members who will be subject to a challenged legal 
provision at some future time—meaning they lack independently justiciable 
claims at the time of the lawsuit—conflicts with Professor Nagareda’s concep-
tion of class actions as purely procedural devices that allow numerous claims to 
be tried together without affecting the substantive law that otherwise applies to 
them.119 A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over claims of class members who 
presently lack standing or whose claims are unripe also raises serious questions 
under Article III that the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed. And 
since absent class members are entitled to neither notice nor an opportunity to 
opt out, due process concerns may frustrate attempts to bind them to the 
court’s judgment.120 If absent class members are not subject to res judicata and 
 
115.  563 U.S. 493, 500 (2011). 
116.  Id. at 531–32 (stating that “[r]elief targeted only at present members of the plaintiff classes may . . . 
fail to adequately protect future class members who will develop serious physical or mental illness”). 
117.  Wilson v. Tinicum Twp., No. 92-6617, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9971, at *21–22 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 
1993). 
118.  See, e.g., Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145, 150 (D.D.C. 2018) (certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class 
of “all pregnant [unaccompanied, undocumented immigrant minors] who are or will be in federal custody 
and, accordingly, are or will be subject to [the government’s] policies or practices”); Planned Parenthood Ark. 
& E. Okla. v. Gillespie, No. 4:15-cv-00566-KGB, 2016 WL 8928315, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2016) (certi-
fying Rule 23(b)(2) class of all “patients who seek to obtain, or desire to obtain, health care services in Ar-
kansas at [Planned Parenthood] through the Medicaid program”); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 
172 F.R.D. 351, 363 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
119.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitra-
tion, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1874 (2006); id. at 1877–78 (“The affording or withholding of 
aggregate treatment is most problematic from an institutional standpoint when it operates as a backdoor 
vehicle to restructure the remedial scheme in applicable substantive law.”). 
      120.  Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
599, 652 (2015) (“[D]ivisible, mandatory class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) thus present the same risk 
that nonconsenting class members will be erroneously deprived of their control entitlement as is present in 
the case of mandatory class actions seeking only money damages.”); Weber, supra note 24, at 387 (arguing 
that Rule 23(b)(2) “violates due process” because “the minimum due process requirements of notice and the 
opportunity to opt out are conspicuously absent”). 
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collateral estoppel and may relitigate an unsuccessful challenge to a legal provi-
sion, they should not be permitted to benefit from a favorable ruling.121 
Finally, in challenges to the validity or proper interpretation of legal provi-
sions, the process for certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class appears to be a largely 
empty, hollow formality that does not yield any benefit to the litigants them-
selves, the court, or even putative class members. In facial challenges to statutes, 
as well as as-applied challenges that are based on broadly applicable legal argu-
ments rather than particular plaintiffs’ unusual factual circumstances, Rule 
23(a)’s numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements will invariably be 
met, virtually as a matter of law, since all members would be asserting the same 
claim based on the same analysis. 122 The putative class members themselves 
are frequently not notified or afforded an opportunity to participate in the case 
or opt out.123 And both the parties and the court are often unaware of the iden-
tities of most class members; indeed, the classes are often defined in sweeping 
terms that include future right holders as well.124 Despite the lack of practical 
benefits to the Rule 23(b)(2) certification process, the Supreme Court neverthe-
less places great emphasis on whether plaintiffs have satisfied that formality.125 
As some courts acknowledge frankly, the main goal of many Rule 23(b)(2) 
classes, particularly in challenges to the validity of legal provisions or other gov-
ernment actions, is not to adjudicate the rights of the party litigants, but rather 
to bind the government defendant against the “world at large.”126 Class actions 
are not the proper tool for that task. Stare decisis is a much more appropriate 
 
121.  See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974). The need for mutuality in Rule 
23(b)(2) class actions against the government is especially important since the Supreme Court has generally 
prohibited plaintiffs from asserting offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. United 
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). 
122.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see, e.g., W.A.O. v. Cuccinelli, No. 2:19-CV-11696, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
159922, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2019) (“Certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is appropriate in this 
case because Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ Policy defeats [Special Immigrant Juvenile] classification for 
all members of the putative class and because an injunction requiring Defendants to suspend that alleged 
Policy would provide relief to the class as a whole.”); Wagafe v. Trump, No. C17-0094-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 95887, at *46 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 2017) (“Plaintiffs allege that CARRP is unlawful and ask the 
Court to enjoin the Government from submitting putative class members’ immigration applications to 
CARRP. A single ruling would therefore provide relief to each member of the class. Accordingly, Rule 
23(b)(2) is satisfied.”). 
        123.  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
        124.  See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
125.  Compare United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538–39 (2018) (holding that a case 
where individual plaintiffs had sought effectively class-wide relief was nonjusticiable after the plaintiffs’ claims 
became moot because it had not been brought or certified as a class action), with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 111 n.11 (1975) (holding that a putative class action suit that had not yet been certified remained justici-
able even after the named plaintiffs’ claims became moot). 
126.  Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 
786, 811 (3d Cir. 1984)); Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Weiss, 
745 F.2d at 811); see also In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MD-1952, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135232, 
at *58–59 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017). 
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mechanism for ensuring that right holders within a court’s geographic jurisdic-
tion are protected by its rulings. Stare decisis does not raise the due process 
concerns of class certification in the Rule 23(b)(2) context. Moreover, by its 
very nature, stare decisis is inherently consistent with geographic and other lim-
itations on the power of lower courts in a way that nationwide classes are not. 
Thus, the Supreme Court should resolve the tension between Califano’s em-
brace of nationwide classes against the government and Mendoza’s rejection of 
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government. It should per-
mit district courts to certify only district- or circuit-wide classes under Rule 
23(b)(2) in cases concerning the validity or proper construction of federal legal 
provisions or other government actions. And, perhaps most importantly, it 
should rely on stare decisis, rather than Rule 23(b)(2) classes, as the primary 
vehicle for extending the benefits of lower courts’ constitutional and other pub-
lic law rulings to third-party right holders. 
C. Associational Injunctions and Informal Plaintiff Classes 
When plaintiff entities assert associational standing in challenges to the va-
lidity or proper interpretation of a legal provision, courts sometimes issue a type 
of backdoor nationwide injunction127 that may be called a nationwide associa-
tional injunction. A proper associational injunction is tailored to enforcing the 
rights of the plaintiff entity’s members. Instead, orders in associational plaintiff 
cases often prohibit the government from enforcing the challenged provision 
against anyone, anywhere in the nation, or require the government to construe 
or apply the provision in a particular way.128 
Cases based on associational standing are effectively informal class actions 
in which the plaintiffs need not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. The Su-
preme Court has held that a membership organization may sue on behalf of its 
members when “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s 
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”129 
 
127.  Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 339, 544–45. 
      128.  See, e.g., Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, No. PWG-19-2715, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177797, at *51 
(D. Md. Oct. 14, 2019) (“[A] nationwide injunction is appropriate to provide complete relief to CASA. CASA 
has over 100,000 members located in Maryland, Virginia, D.C., and Pennsylvania.”); Saget v. Trump, 375 F. 
Supp. 3d 280, 378–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Here, a national injunction is warranted in this case. Plaintiffs not 
only include residents of New York but also individuals and a nonprofit entity based in Florida. Limiting a 
preliminary injunction to the parties would not adequately protect the interests of all stakeholders.”). 
129.  United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 
(1996) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 
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An entity asserting associational standing acts as a stand-in for its members, 
asserting those members’ rights on their behalf.130 When the plaintiff associa-
tion prevails, the proper relief is a plaintiff-oriented injunction tailored to pre-
venting the government from enforcing the challenged legal provision against 
the organization’s members at the time of judgment.  A plaintiff group asserting 
associational standing should not be permitted to seek broader relief than its 
members could have received had they sued in their own right. The procedural 
vehicle of associational standing should not affect the underlying substantive 
rights of the real parties in interest or relief the court may order. In particular, 
a court should not issue a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction,131 com-
pletely prohibiting the government defendant from enforcing the challenged 
provision against anyone, regardless of whether they are affiliated with the or-
ganization.132 
The First Circuit’s ruling in Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. 
v. Reilly shows the appropriate approach to crafting injunctive relief in associa-
tional standing cases.133 Several plaintiff environmental groups sued, alleging 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had “failed to assess and eval-
uate federal facilities for hazardous waste” as required by the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.134 They 
sought a nationwide injunction to compel the EPA to conduct a statutorily re-
quired “preliminary assessment” of every potential hazardous waste site across 
the nation identified in its Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance 
Docket.135 The plaintiff groups alleged that some of their members lived near 
some of the facilities on the Docket that the EPA had not yet evaluated and 
that at least some of the facilities on the Docket contained unremediated haz-
ardous waste.136 
The district court held that, because some of the plaintiff groups’ members 
faced a risk of harm from certain sites, the groups could “pursue the legal rights 
of the general public and request a remedy for all of the national sites for which 
the [EPA] is responsible.”137 It later ordered the EPA to “conduct a preliminary 
assessment of each facility on the Docket” within eighteen months.138 The First 
 
130.  See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 24 (2000) (“The Council speaks 
only on behalf of its member institutions, and thus has standing only because of the injury those members 
allegedly suffer.”). 
131.  See infra Part I.D. 
132.  For examples of such orders, see supra note 128. 
133.  950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991). 
134.  Conserv. Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Reilly, 743 F. Supp. 933, 934 (D. Mass. 1990), 
rev’d, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991). 
135.  Id. at 935, 943. 
136.  Id. at 937. 
137.  Id. at 940. 
138.  Conservation Law Found. of New Eng., Inc. v. Reilly, 755 F. Supp. 475, 481 (D. Mass. 1991), 
rev’d, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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Circuit reversed, holding that each “individual member[]” for whom the plain-
tiff groups had introduced evidence possessed standing “with respect to the 
individual federal facilities that threaten to or actually harm them.”139 Those 
allegations, however, were “insufficient to warrant the type of nationwide re-
lief” the court awarded.140 The court added, “[P]laintiffs seek relief far beyond 
any injury they have established. . . . Because plaintiffs have ties to only a few 
federal facilities, they have failed to carry their burden of showing injury-in-fact 
sufficient to grant them standing to obtain nationwide injunctive relief.”141 Con-
servation Law Foundation shows how courts can appropriately tailor the scope of 
their injunctions in associational standing cases. 
More broadly, it may be appropriate to assess the continued need for asso-
ciational standing. An associational plaintiff acts as a premade class comprised 
of the right holders whose interests will be litigated in the case. Associational 
standing is simply a way of allowing a plaintiff entity to shape its own plaintiff 
class without satisfying Rule 23’s procedures and restrictions. The Court’s per-
sistent formalistic emphasis on Rule 23142 suggests that plaintiffs should not be 
able to circumvent it by collectively pursuing their claims through a private or-
ganization. 
Moreover, Rule 17 provides, “An action must be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest.”143 Associational standing seems to violate this rule, 
since the real parties in interest are not the association itself but rather its mem-
bers. Requiring members of the association to litigate directly as either party 
litigants or class members would not prejudice them. The association would 
still be able to represent them and conduct the litigation, and a case could pro-
ceed along almost the same route whether the plaintiff is the association itself, 
a class of the association’s members certified under Rule 23, or simply individ-
ual members of the association. 
While future scholarship should reassess the benefits of, and need for, as-
sociational standing, the Court need not go so far as to abolish it. Rather, courts 
should simply recognize that when entities assert associational standing, they 
are acting as prefabricated classes litigating on behalf of their members. Accord-
ingly, injunctive relief should be tailored to enforcing the rights of those mem-
bers as if they had litigated individually or through a formal class action. 
 
139.  Conservation Law Found., 950 F.2d at 41. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. at 43. 
142.  See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2018); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399–402, 402 n.11 (1975). 
143.  FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). 
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D. Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
Nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions are what most commentators 
refer to when discussing nationwide injunctions, whether by that name or their 
preferred alternate terminology.144 A nationwide defendant-oriented injunction 
is an order prohibiting a government agency or official from enforcing a chal-
lenged legal provision against anyone, anywhere in the nation. Similarly, 
statewide defendant-oriented injunctions may be entered against state legal pro-
visions. These orders are “defendant-oriented” because the court’s goal is com-
pletely prohibiting the defendant from enforcing the challenged provision, ra-
ther than enforcing the rights of the particular plaintiffs before it.145  
1. Rationales for Rejecting 
The arguments against nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions have 
been laid out in greater depth in other sources146 and will only be briefly 
sketched out here. First, as I have argued elsewhere,147 such orders violate Ar-
ticle III. Article III requires a plaintiff to establish standing to seek the particular 
relief it is requesting from the court.148 A plaintiff generally lacks standing to 
seek relief on behalf of third-party nonlitigants,149 and a federal court corre-
spondingly lacks jurisdiction to exceed the boundaries of the case or contro-
versy before it by unnecessarily enforcing the rights of third-party nonliti-
gants.150 Thus, when a court determines that a legal provision is 
 
144.  See supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
145.  See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 500. 
146.  Id. at 522–23. See generally Bray, supra note 22; Siddique, supra note 22; Wasserman, supra note 22. 
147.  Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 523–27. 
      148.  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (holding that a plaintiff “bears the burden 
of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought”); see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 723 
(2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Plaintiffs must establish standing as to each form of relief they re-
quest . . . .”); see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff’s standing 
to seek damages from the defendant did not automatically confer standing to seek injunctive relief, as well). 
149.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) (“To have standing, a litigant must seek relief 
for an injury that affects him in a ‘personal and individual way.’” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992))); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces . . . the 
general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights . . . .”). 
150.  Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 734 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding that Article III forbids 
federal courts from issuing orders that “cover additional actions that produce no concrete harm to the original 
plaintiff”); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burden-
some to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” (emphasis added)); Doran v. 
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“[N]either declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere 
with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plain-
tiffs . . . .”); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n.1 (1976) (holding that if a district court did not 
certify a class, “the action is not properly a class action” and cannot be treated as such); see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of 
Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 939 (1993) (mem.) (staying a lower court injunction insofar as it prohibited 
the military from applying the challenged regulation to anyone other than the individual plaintiff); Perkens v. 
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 123 (1940) (declaring that the D.C. Circuit’s nationwide defendant-oriented 
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unconstitutional, the plaintiff may not seek, and a court may not grant, an in-
junction that unnecessarily extends beyond protecting that plaintiff’s rights. As 
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Gill v. Whitford, “‘[S]tanding is not 
dispensed in gross’: A plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plain-
tiff’s particular injury.”151 
Second, nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions violate Rule 23 by giv-
ing effectively class-wide relief to all right holders without following the process 
or satisfying the criteria set forth in that rule for certifying a class action.152 Only 
last year, in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s attempt to treat a nonclass case brought by individual plaintiffs whose 
claims subsequently became moot as a “functional class action.”153  The Sanchez-
Gomez Court expressly declared, “[C]ourts may not ‘recognize . . . a common-
law kind of class action’ or ‘create de facto class actions at will.’”154 Nationwide 
defendant-oriented injunctions impermissibly treat lawsuits by individual plain-
tiffs as de facto class actions. 
Third, such orders have unfairly asymmetric preclusion consequences.155 
No matter how many times the government prevails at the district court level 
in defending a legal provision, other plaintiffs remain free to bring identical 
challenges, either in the same or different circuits. District court rulings gener-
ally lack any stare decisis effect, and legal rulings against one plaintiff generally 
do not bind other similarly situated right holders as a matter of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel.156 In contrast, if the government loses even a single case and 
the court issues a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction, it constitutes a vic-
tory for all right holders throughout the nation. The government is completely 
prevented from enforcing the challenged provision against anyone—potentially 
even right holders who previously challenged the provision and lost, as well as 
right holders in circuits that have interpreted the Constitution or challenged 
provision differently. 
Fourth, nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions raise the same concerns 
about the structure of the federal judicial system as nationwide plaintiff-class 
injunctions.157 By enacting the Evarts Act,158 Congress made a deliberate deci-
 
injunction against the Secretary of Labor “goes beyond any controversy that might have existed between the 
complaining companies and the Government officials”); see also Wasserman, supra note 22, at 359–63. 
        151.  138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006)). 
152.  Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 534–35; see also Bray, supra note 22, at 464. 
153.  138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 657–58 
(9th Cir. 2017)). 
154.  Id. at 1539 (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008)). 
155.  Bray, supra note 22, at 464; Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 531–34. 
156.  See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 906. 
157.  See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
158.  Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
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sion to limit the consequences of lower courts’ rulings, including in constitu-
tional cases.159 It established neither a centralized intermediate court of appeals 
nor an integrated system of intermediate appellate courts that act as a single 
unified circuit. Rather, it separated the courts of appeals into numerous regional 
circuits,160 each able to develop its own body of law.161 
Congress further enhanced the importance of regional courts of appeals in 
constitutional litigation in the mid-1970s. In 1937, Congress had enacted a stat-
ute requiring plaintiffs seeking injunctions against federal laws on the grounds 
they were unconstitutional to pursue their claims before a three-judge panel of 
a federal district court, with direct appeal as of right to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.162  The Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying the bill, in lan-
guage echoing the defenders of nationwide injunctions, explained:  
A Federal statute is held legal by one judge in one district; it is 
simultaneously held illegal by another judge in another district. An 
act valid in one judicial circuit is invalid in another judicial circuit. 
Thus rights fully accorded to one group of citizens may be denied to 
others. As a practical matter this means that for periods running as 
long as 1 year or 2 years or 3 years—until final determination can be 
made by the Supreme Court—the law loses its most indispensable 
element—equality. 
. . . [D]uring these long processes the normal operations of so-
ciety and government are handicapped in many cases by differing 
and divided opinions in the lower courts and by the lack of any clear 
guide for the dispatch of business. Thereby our legal system is fast 
losing another essential of justice—certainty.163 
Thus, throughout the mid-twentieth century, constitutional challenges to fed-
eral laws bypassed the regional courts of appeals to reach the Supreme Court 
more quickly. Congress gave the Court jurisdiction to impose uniform consti-
tutional rules across the nation more quickly, protecting all right holders equally.   
 In 1976, however, Congress abandoned this approach, subjecting virtually 
all constitutional litigation to the same appellate process as other cases.164  The 
Department of Justice supported the amendment in large part because it be-
lieved that both the requirement for three-judge district court panels, as well as 
 
159.  Cf. Frost, supra note 23, at 1111–12. 
160.  Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826. 
161.  Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900). 
      162.  Act of Aug. 24, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-352, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752–53. 
      163.  S. REP. NO. 75-711, at 27–28 (1937). 
      164.  See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1–3, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119. 
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a right of appellate review in the Supreme Court, unnecessarily “waste[d] valu-
able federal judicial resources.”165 Thus, Congress made a specific, conscious 
decision to reintegrate regional courts of appeals back into the appellate struc-
ture for constitutional cases. It made a deliberate trade-off, sacrificing speedier 
Supreme Court review and national uniformity for the perceived benefits of the 
regional appellate structure.  
Allowing lower court judges to exercise sweeping nationwide authority to 
completely invalidate federal statutes, executive orders, regulations, and other 
legal provisions is inconsistent with the decentralized, hierarchical structure of 
the federal judiciary.166 Defendant-oriented injunctions permit a single district 
judge of ostensibly limited geographic jurisdiction to give his or her legal deter-
minations the force of law throughout the nation, including for third-party non-
litigants in other jurisdictions whose claims would otherwise be governed by 
the law of other circuits.   
Such injunctions also prevent the government from being able to relitigate 
important constitutional issues in various districts and circuits. As noted earlier, 
in United States v. Mendoza, the Supreme Court generally prohibited plaintiffs 
from asserting offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government, 
specifically to preserve the government’s ability to relitigate such issues.167  Na-
tionwide defendant-oriented injunctions are flatly inconsistent with Mendoza.168 
They treat an adverse district court ruling as binding against the government 
throughout the nation. Indeed, such orders go even further than the type of 
offensive collateral estoppel the Mendoza Court rejected, since other right hold-
ers are not even required to file their own lawsuits to be protected by a favorable 
court ruling.   
Fifth, injunctions are a form of equitable relief governed by traditional eq-
uitable principles dating back to the English Court of Chancery.169 As Professor 
 
      165.  Hearing before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 6150: Improvement of Judicial Machinery, 8 (June 20, 1975) (statement of 
Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr.). 
166.  See Berger, supra note 22 (reiterating how the decentralized structure of the federal judiciary, with 
district courts of limited geographic jurisdiction and circuits with distinct bodies of precedent, strongly coun-
sels against nationwide injunctions); Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 535–38. 
      167.  464 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1984). 
      168.  Professor Zachary Clopton has argued that Mendoza was wrongly decided and that the preclusion 
principles set forth in Parkland Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979), should apply to the government 
as well. Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5, 29 (2019). Professor 
Alan M. Trammell likewise rejects Mendoza, suggesting that district courts should decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether the government is precluded from relitigating particular issues based on whether relitigation 
would increase the likelihood of reaching an accurate outcome. Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 615–16 (2017). However, the structure of the federal judicial system—particularly 
in light of Congress’s intentional reintegration of regional courts of appeals into the appellate process for 
constitutional cases—seems to counsel strongly in favor of allowing relitigation and percolation of important 
public law issues in various circuits. See supra notes 157–66 and accompanying text. 
169.  Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 238 (2018). 
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Samuel L. Bray demonstrated in great detail, English Chancery Courts histori-
cally did not grant nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions,170 and American 
courts seldom did so before the mid-twentieth century.171  
A range of pragmatic considerations further bolster the case against nation-
wide defendant-oriented injunctions. Professors Bray and Howard Wasserman 
point out that such orders exacerbate the incentives for, and consequences of, 
forum shopping.172 When a public interest group brings a constitutional chal-
lenge or other public law case, a right holder can typically be found in just about 
any judicial district to act as a plaintiff and establish proper venue.173  The group 
will generally select the district and division where the judges are most likely to 
be ideologically predisposed to rule in their favor.  
This means that controversial constitutional and other challenges will tend 
to be adjudicated by ideological outliers toward the extremes of the political 
spectrum, depending on the nature of the case, rather than a more representa-
tive cross section of the federal judiciary.174 Lower court adjudications will dis-
proportionately reflect such ideologically skewed judicial views,175 rather than 
those of the median judge. And nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions al-
low these judicial outliers to impose their potentially idiosyncratic views 
throughout the nation, even if only temporarily.   
Although appellate review is available, circuits exhibit comparable variation 
in the ideological and methodological preferences of their judges. Moreover, a 
district court’s factual findings and discretionary judgment calls can influence 
and even cabin the appellate court’s conclusions.176  Thus, allowing ideologically 
outlying district courts to determine the validity of federal legal provisions for 
 
170.  Bray, supra note 22, at 425–27; see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2427 (2018) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
171.  Bray, supra note 22, 428–37; see also Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2427. Professor Mila Sohani offers a few 
examples of courts sporadically issuing nationwide and statewide defendant-oriented injunctions in the early 
and mid-twentieth century, though the issue was not actively litigated in most of these cases. Mila Sohani, The 
Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3457701. 
172.  Bray, supra note 22, at 457–61; Wasserman, supra note 22, at 363–64. But see Malveaux, supra note 
23, at 57. 
173.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C) (2012). 
174.  See Matthew Erickson, Note, Who, What and Where: A Case for Multifactor Balancing as a Solution to 
Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 338 n.39 (2018). 
175.  See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 
90 VA. L. REV. 301, 352 (2004) (“No reasonable person seriously doubts that ideology, understood as nor-
mative commitments of various sorts, helps to explain judicial votes.”). 
176.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“In shaping equity decrees, 
the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow.” (citing 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 27 n.10 (1971))); John O. McGinnis & 
Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 124 (2008) (noting that appellate 
courts “generally defer to lower courts’ findings of adjudicative fact in all constitutional cases except defama-
tion cases covered by the First Amendment” and “sometimes suggest” that “social fact-finding of lower 
courts . . . deserve[s] deference” as well (emphasis omitted)). 
1 MORLEY 1-65 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019  8:31 PM 
2019] Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions 33 
the entire nation, even if only in the first instance, can skew the development 
of the law.  
Additionally, the attorneys and groups crafting constitutional challenges 
will generally try to select the most sympathetic plaintiffs with the most com-
pelling factual contexts for invalidating the provision at issue.177  Controversial, 
cutting-edge constitutional issues will be presented through handpicked, care-
fully curated, quite possibly unrepresentative fact patterns. And when a lower 
court issues a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction, the government is 
compelled to appeal that particular case to prevent the challenged provision 
from being completely nullified.178  Thus, constitutional law will systematically 
be created in the most compelling and sympathetic cases for invalidation, rather 
than a more representative cross-section of cases in which an issue may arise.   
Another largely overlooked consequence of nationwide defendant-oriented 
injunctions is that they repeatedly trigger emergency litigation, often involving 
the Supreme Court. Lower courts’ increased willingness to issue or approve 
such orders has led to repeated requests for stays and other types of extraordi-
nary relief from the Court179 to prevent federal statutes, regulations, or execu-
tive orders from being completely nullified throughout the nation based on the 
ruling of a single lower court judge or panel.180 The rights of millions of Amer-
icans throughout the nation are repeatedly flicked on and off like a light switch 
as injunctions are stayed, and those stays, in turn, are vacated or reimposed by 
the motions and merits panels of courts of appeals, en banc courts, and the 
Supreme Court itself. Highly controversial, unsettled constitutional issues are 
briefed and considered in a matter of days. The prevalence of nationwide de-
fendant-oriented injunctions has routinized extraordinary emergency litigation 
procedures that are ill-suited for politically charged, cutting-edge constitutional 
issues that lie squarely in the public eye. Thus, for a variety of constitutional, 
rule-based, fairness-based, structural, historical, and pragmatic reasons, courts 
 
177.  See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1987–88) (explaining that public-interest lawyers often choose clients 
strategically, based on how the court will view the client’s “story”); see, e.g., William C. Duncan, The Role of 
Litigation in Gay Rights: The Marriage Experience, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 115 (2005) (explaining how 
gay rights advocates “carefully selected” the plaintiffs in their challenge to Massachusetts’s same-sex marriage 
ban “after an interview process to ensure they would provide a sympathetic face for the legal claims”); Mark 
V. Tushnet, Litigation Campaigns and the Search for Constitutional Rules, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 109 
(2004) (discussing conservative groups’ strategic selection of plaintiffs in challenges to affirmative action). 
178.  Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 (1984) (“The application of nonmutual estoppel 
against the Government would force the Solicitor General to abandon those prudential concerns and to 
appeal every adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing further review.”). 
179.  See Steve I. Vladeck, Comment, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2019) (draft at 13–22), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420221. 
180.  See, e.g., Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, No. 19A230, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4619 (Sept. 11, 2019) 
(staying nationwide injunction against rule requiring refugees to seek asylum in the first safe country they 
enter); Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.) (staying nationwide injunction against prohibition 
on transgender military service); Trump v. Stockman, 139 S. Ct. 950 (2019) (mem.) (same). 
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should decline to issue any type of defendant-oriented injunction—especially 
on a nationwide basis.   
2. Responding to the Main Defenses 
Lower courts that have entered or approved nationwide defendant-ori-
ented injunctions typically rely on a few recurring arguments. Many emphasize 
the fact that the challenged legal provision applies on a nationwide basis and a 
narrower, plaintiff-oriented injunction would leave some right holders unpro-
tected.181 Courts particularly stress the need for uniformity when granting relief 
in the immigration context.182  These rulings tend to overlook the fact that one 
of the distinguishing characteristics of the Article III “judicial power” is that it 
operates upon the litigants involved in the case or controversy before the court, 
rather than the general public.183   
The propriety of limiting relief to the particular plaintiffs involved in a case 
is abundantly clear in the context of a damages suit. When a mass tort such as 
a train wreck occurs, if certain passengers bring a nonclass suit and prevail, they 
may obtain damages only for themselves, not on behalf of other similarly situ-
ated passengers. This principle is likewise apparent in the context of a suit for 
equitable relief against a private defendant. If a company such as Apple sues 
Samsung for patent infringement, it may seek an injunction prohibiting Sam-
sung from infringing its patent in the future.184 Apple could not go further, 
however, to enjoin Samsung from violating other companies’ patents. These 
same restrictions apply with equal force when litigants seek injunctions against 
government policies.  
 
181.  See, e.g., Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting a nationwide injunc-
tion against the termination of temporary protected status for Haiti in part because “this action does not 
involve case-by-case enforcement of a particular policy or statute,” but rather “concerns a single decision on 
a nationwide policy”); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 677–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(“[T]hese cases . . . concern a single decision about a single questionnaire, to be used on a single census 
throughout the nation.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); see also Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-
1297-MJP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100789, at *10 (W.D. Wash. June 15, 2018) (“The Ban, like the Constitu-
tion, would apply nationwide. Accordingly, a nationwide injunction is appropriate.”), stayed pending appeal, 139 
S. Ct. 950 (2019), stayed and remanded, 926 F.3d 1180, 1207 (9th Cir. 2019). 
182.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“A final principle is also relevant: the need for uniformity in immigration policy.”), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 
2779 (2019); Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, No. PWG-19-2715, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177797, at *53–54 (D. 
Md. Oct. 14, 2019) (“A limited geographical injunction could create a patchwork of immigration policies 
applied across the nation. . . . [P]reserving . . . the vigorous and uniform enforcement of immigration laws 
weighs in favor of a nationwide injunction . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). 
183.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974) (“While the Supreme Court of California may 
choose to adjudicate a controversy simply because of its public importance, and the desirability of a statewide 
decision, we are limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III to adjudication of actual disputes 
between adverse parties.”); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2428 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see infra note 219. 
184.  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
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Courts have also declared that a nationwide injunction is the only appro-
priate relief when a legal provision is found to be facially unconstitutional or 
invalid.185 The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is a matter 
of substantive doctrine, however, that governs the showing a plaintiff must 
make to prevail on the merits.186  A determination of facial unconstitutionality 
is made in the context of a particular case between certain litigants by a lower 
court of limited authority within the federal judicial structure. The fact that the 
court rests its judgment on a facial, rather than as-applied, theory does not au-
thorize it to ignore the boundaries of the case or controversy before it to en-
force the rights of third-party nonlitigants, especially those in other districts and 
circuits.   
Many courts insist that nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions are gen-
erally the proper form of relief in challenges under the APA,187 which permits 
courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action under various circum-
stances.188  A court may “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action within the 
context of a particular case, however, without necessarily invalidating the chal-
lenged provision as applied to third-party nonlitigants throughout the nation.189  
Moreover, to the extent the APA purports to authorize a federal court to award 
plaintiffs relief that they lack Article III standing to seek or to go beyond the 
bounds of the case or controversy before it by enforcing the rights of third-
party nonlitigants, the provision may very well be unconstitutional as applied. 
Nevertheless, even if one concludes that the APA validly empowers federal 
courts to issue nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions in certain types of 
cases, then, at a minimum, courts should not claim such sweeping authority for 
themselves in cases where Congress has not expressly authorized it.   
 
185.  See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[W]here a 
law is unconstitutional on its face, and not simply in its application to certain plaintiffs, a nationwide injunc-
tion is appropriate.” (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)), reconsid. den’d, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
186.  See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Repub. Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–50 (2008) (explaining 
requirements for facial challenges). 
187.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[W]hen a reviewing court de-
termines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their 
application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.” (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 
n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)), reconsid. den’d, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018), stayed in part pending appeal, 321 F. 
Supp. 3d 143 (D.D.C. 2018) (staying injunction as to new DACA applicants), cert. before judgment granted, 139 
S. Ct. 2779 (2019); accord Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
89694, at *128 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2016). 
188.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
189.  See, e.g., L.A. Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he national 
injunction was too broad. An order declaring the hospice cap regulation invalid, enjoining further enforce-
ment against [the plaintiff], and requiring the Secretary to recalculate its liability in conformity with the hos-
pice cap statute, would have afforded the plaintiff complete relief.”); Va. Soc’y for Human Life v. FEC, 263 
F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001) (overturning a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction because “[p]reventing 
the FEC from enforcing 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) against other parties in other circuits does not provide any 
additional relief to [the plaintiff]”). 
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Following the first generation of scholarship identifying the problems with 
nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, defenders also rose in response. 
Most of the academic arguments in favor of such orders center around their 
utility for third-party nonlitigants, who often are not in a position to quickly and 
effectively enforce their own rights. Professor Suzette Malveaux, for example, 
argues that these nationwide injunctions are necessary as “an important check 
on the executive branch of government”190 because “[m]any of the current ad-
ministration’s executive orders target the most vulnerable populations in our 
society—including various minorities, immigrants, and children.”191 Such prac-
tical considerations do not allow courts to ignore jurisdictional, rule-based, and 
other limitations on their authority, however. 
Professor Amanda Frost has offered an especially compelling and compre-
hensive defense of nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, but her argu-
ments ultimately do not provide a sufficient basis for them.192 First, Professor 
Frost contends the English judiciary’s “bill of peace” constitutes a historical 
antecedent for such orders that Article III’s judicial power should be interpreted 
to include.193 Bills of peace allowed English courts to adjudicate the rights of 
members of broadly dispersed groups without formally joining them to a law-
suit through the usual procedures.194 They do not provide a justification for 
nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, however, because courts’ rulings in 
such cases were equally binding on all parties, including all of the potential right 
holders or claimants, regardless of whether they won or lost.195 
With nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, in contrast, the govern-
ment faces asymmetric preclusion. A single victory by any plaintiff can result in 
an order running in favor of all other similarly situated right holders throughout 
the nation.196 If a plaintiff loses, however, that ruling does not preclude other 
right holders from bringing identical claims, whether in the same circuit or more 
 
190.  Malveaux, supra note 23, at 62. 
191.  Id. at 64. 
192.  Frost, supra note 23. 
193.  Id. at 1080–81. 
194.  1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 251 (San Francisco, A. 
L. Bancroft & Co. 1881). 
195.  1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 172 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & 
Co. 1836); see also 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.10 (5th ed. 2018); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 97, 
§ 1751; Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 866, 877 (1977); Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits; Are They Class Actions?, 42 IOWA L. REV. 568, 569 
(1957); cf. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Note, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1298–99 
(1932). 
196.  Indeed, such injunctions may even protect people who previously litigated the same claims against 
the government and lost or who live in circuits that have construed the Constitution or federal law in a 
materially different manner. 
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favorable jurisdictions.197 In actuality, the bill of peace is the historical anteced-
ent to the Rule 23(b)(2) class action device198—to the extent such orders may 
bind third parties199—not nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions. 
Bills of peace are further distinguishable from both nationwide defendant-
oriented injunctions and modern class actions because the members of the 
plaintiff group (the “multitude”) usually had some preexisting relationship or 
commonality with each other apart from the alleged injury giving rise to the 
lawsuit.200  The Chancery Court relied on that preexisting relationship as part 
of its justification for binding members of the multitude to its ruling. The Chan-
cery “felt reasonably confident about the fairness of adjudicating rights of ab-
sentees where the absentees belonged to a preexisting group and some mem-
bers of the group were before the court as litigants.”201 Thus, the bill of peace 
does not establish that nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions are con-
sistent with traditional equitable practices.  
Professor Frost also contends that Article III allows federal courts to issue 
nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, but she does not explain how that 
conclusion is consistent with cases such as Califano v. Yamasaki,202 Doran v. Salem 
Inn, Inc.,203 and other precedents discussed above,204 which provide otherwise. 
She points to exceptions to Article III’s justiciability requirements, such as the 
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine205 
and allowances for third-party standing,206 but those are just that: exceptions. 
Attempting to justify nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions as an excep-
tion to general Article III principles is a tacit admission that they violate those 
generally applicable rules.  
Moreover, there is no need to create an exception to Article III’s generally 
applicable justiciability requirements for nationwide defendant-oriented injunc-
tions. Rule 23(b)(2) class actions and district- or circuit-wide stare decisis for 
lower court opinions are available alternatives that fit much more comfortably 
 
197.  See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
198.  See Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements in Class 
Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 88 (1998) (“[T]he English bill of peace served as the pre-
cursor to the class action . . . .”); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2002) (“The modern class action counts among its forebears the seven-
teenth-century ‘bill of peace.’”). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Distant Mirror: The Bill of Peace in Early 
American Mass Torts and Its Implications for Modern Class Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1997). 
199.  But see supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
      200.  Yeazell, supra note 195, at 876–77. 
      201.  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1849, 1865 (1998). 
202.  442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant 
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”). 
203.  422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (“[N]either declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with 
enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs . . . .”). 
      204.  See supra notes 148–51. 
205.  Frost, supra note 23, at 1083–84 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)). 
206.  Id. at 1084 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)). 
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against the backdrop of the federal judicial system. Additionally, the Court’s 
precedents concerning remedial standing do not suggest that any such excep-
tion for defendant-oriented injunctions exists.207  
Much of Professor Frost’s analysis centers around injunctions concerning 
“indivisible rights,” in which it is necessary to enforce the rights of third-party 
nonlitigants in order to fully enforce the rights of the party plaintiffs before the 
court.208 Examples include redistricting, school desegregation, and certain kinds 
of prison-reform cases. Her discussion demonstrates the importance and utility 
of this Article’s proposed taxonomy. Traditional justiciability-related principles 
confirm that a valid plaintiff-oriented injunction may compel the government 
to take whatever action is necessary to enforce the rights of the plaintiffs before 
the court, even if those orders are nationwide in scope and incidentally benefit 
third parties.209 They do not provide any basis for nationwide defendant-ori-
ented injunctions concerning divisible rights, however, where it is possible to 
enforce a plaintiff’s rights without  simultaneously enforcing those of similarly 
situated nonlitigants. 
Professor Frost’s discussion of Trump v. Hawaii, the Travel Ban Case, con-
firms the efficacy of plaintiff-oriented injunctions and further shows how this 
Article’s proposed taxonomy can prevent confusion about remedial alternatives 
in constitutional and other public law cases.210 She argues that a nationwide 
defendant-oriented injunction completely enjoining the travel ban was “essen-
tial” to protect plaintiff State of Hawaii’s interests.211 The ban impeded the Uni-
versity of Hawaii’s “ability to recruit” noncitizens as students or faculty.212 An 
injunction limited to the geographic territory of Hawaii would not be effective, 
Professor Frost reasons, “because the United States does not restrict travel 
among the fifty states by a noncitizen lawfully residing in one of them.”213  
This analysis exemplifies the confusion that arises from the term nationwide 
injunction, with its focus on an order’s geographic reach. Professor Frost implies 
that the district court’s two main options were either an injunction against the 
travel ban for anyone traveling to the State of Hawaii or a nationwide injunction 
suspending the ban throughout the nation.214 The real issue, however, was the 
identities of the people or entities protected by the injunction.  
The State of Hawaii claimed that the travel ban impeded its ability to attract 
teachers and students to its university. The court could have fully vindicated the 
 
      207.  See supra notes 148–51. 
208.  See Frost, supra note 23, at 1091–92 (quoting Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 491–
92); see also id. at 1082–84. 
209.  See supra Part I.A. 
210.  Frost, supra note 23, at 1090–91. 
211.  Id. at 1092. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
214.  See id. at 1091–92. 
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State’s rights by entering a plaintiff-oriented injunction prohibiting the Govern-
ment from applying the travel ban to any person with a bona fide relationship 
with the University of Hawaii traveling to the United States. Either the potential 
traveler or the University could have been required to submit an affidavit at-
testing that the traveler is a student, faculty member, potential applicant, or 
other affiliate of the University to confirm that person’s entitlement to an ex-
emption from the ban.215 The applicability of the travel ban would be based not 
on the airport into which a person was flying or even the state to which that 
person was traveling, but rather on the person’s relationship to the plaintiff in 
the case. Far from demonstrating that nationwide defendant-oriented injunc-
tions are necessary to give plaintiffs complete relief, as Professor Frost con-
tends,216 the Travel Ban Case is a perfect example of how plaintiff-oriented in-
junctions can be used to enforce divisible rights.  
Professor Frost goes on to frame the debate over nationwide injunctions 
in terms of conflicting perceptions over the proper role of federal courts: a 
dispute over whether their role and powers should be based on a “law declara-
tion” model or “dispute resolution” model.217 I share this view,218 with an im-
portant caveat: federal courts do not possess law-declaration authority in the 
abstract, but rather must exercise that power within the confines of a particular 
case or controversy.219 When a court—particularly a lower court—adjudicates 
the validity or meaning of a legal provision, it is not making a freestanding, 
abstract determination of general applicability. To the contrary, it is taking a 
step in its process of reaching a judgment concerning the parties before it. The 
very definition of the Article III judicial power, set forth in terms of the author-
ity to adjudicate cases and controversies,220 means courts may not unnecessarily 
go beyond the bounds of the matters before them to impose their view of the 
law on the world at large. 
Professor Frost also emphasizes that nationwide defendant-oriented in-
junctions are often necessary to protect third-party nonlitigants from irrepara-
ble injury.221 As this Article contends, however, the main mechanisms through 
 
      215.  Cf. Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va. 2017) (entering a plaintiff-oriented injunc-
tion prohibiting the Government from enforcing an earlier version of the travel ban “as it relates to Virginia 
residents, Virginia institutions, and persons connected to those persons and institutions”). 
      216.  See Frost, supra note 23, at 1092 (calling the nationwide defendant-oriented injunction “essential 
to protect the plaintiffs’ interests”). 
217.  See id. at 1087–88. 
218.  See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 22, at 519–20, 523. 
219.  See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960) (“The very foundation of the power of the 
federal courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to 
decide cases and controversies properly before them.”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of 
Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (holding that a federal court “has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, 
either of a State or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is 
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies”). 
220.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
221.  Frost, supra note 23, at 1094–95. 
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which a court’s constitutional and other public law rulings protect the general 
public are class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and stare decisis, not injunc-
tions. Whereas the political branches may act directly on the general public, 
courts’ actions focus primarily on the parties to the cases and controversies they 
adjudicate, over whom they have acquired personal jurisdiction.222 In addition, 
the decentralized, hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary reflects Con-
gress’s deliberate decision to limit the effects of lower courts’ rulings rather than 
maximize protection for third-party nonlitigants.   
Finally, Professor Frost contends that nationwide defendant-oriented in-
junctions are easier to administer than plaintiff-oriented injunctions.223 Alt-
hough this is correct, such administrative difficulties typically do not affect the 
proper scope of relief. A plaintiff-oriented injunction leaves the defendant 
agency or official free to go further than legally required by completely abstain-
ing from enforcing the challenged legal provision against anyone. Indeed, Con-
gress, the President, or the agency may decide to amend or repeal the challenged 
provision if it would be too difficult, or undermine important policy objectives, 
to treat certain plaintiffs differently from everyone else. 
A broad nationwide defendant-oriented injunction, in contrast, preempts 
that choice by flatly prohibiting the agency from even attempting to continue 
administering the challenged provision against third parties. A court should not 
restrict the government’s enforcement discretion more than necessary to pro-
tect the plaintiffs’ rights, particularly if it is purportedly doing so out of concern 
for the government’s convenience, costs, or administrative burdens. A defend-
ant agency or official should generally be able to make the policy determination 
of whether the benefits of implementing as much of an enjoined legal provision 
as possible outweigh the inconvenience of applying different legal regimes to 
different groups of people—a burden the government already bears when cir-
cuit splits arise. Of course, if the government continues enforcing a challenged 
provision against third parties and winds up violating the plaintiffs’ rights in the 
process, the court may order broader prophylactic relief by enjoining the pro-
vision on a wider scale. Even then, however, the focus is on protecting the 
rights of the plaintiffs before the court, rather than independently seeking to 
 
222.  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“Personal jurisdiction, too, is ‘an 
essential element of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court,’ without which the court is ‘powerless to proceed 
to an adjudication.’” (omission in original) (quoting Emp’rs Reins. Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937))). 
223.  Frost, supra note 23, at 1098–99 (“Nationwide injunctions are sometimes the only practicable 
method of providing relief and can avoid the cost and confusion of piecemeal injunctions.”); see also Batalla 
Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (entering a nationwide defendant-oriented 
injunction against the Trump Administration’s attempted termination of the DACA program in part due to 
the potential “administrative problems for Defendants” in complying with a narrower order), cert. granted sub 
nom. McAlennan v. Vidal, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 973 (E.D. Mich. 
2013) (entering a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction because “[a]n injunction applicable only to the 
named plaintiffs would be impractical and difficult to enforce”). 
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vindicate the rights of third-party nonlitigants.224 Precisely because prophylactic 
relief restricts the democratically elected branches of government more than 
the Constitution actually requires, courts may grant it only when the record 
demonstrates its necessity.225 Such relief should seldom, if ever, be a first resort. 
In short, Professor Frost presents a thorough, well-crafted, powerfully ar-
gued defense of nationwide injunctions. Her analysis confirms the need to dis-
tinguish among the different categories of such orders. Beyond that, she has 
reaffirmed that broad nationwide plaintiff-oriented injunctions, which may in-
cidentally benefit third parties, can be necessary to enforce indivisible rights. 
Nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, however, remain improper.   
E. Private Enforcement Injunctions 
The final type of nationwide injunction, what may be called a nationwide 
private enforcement injunction, is an order prohibiting private enforcement of 
a federal legal provision against a particular entity. It is the least studied because 
it rarely, if ever, is issued.226 When a private actor—a corporation, for exam-
ple—wishes to challenge the validity of a federal law or regulation, it typically 
sues the federal official charged with enforcing the measure, in his or her official 
capacity, for an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or both. Many federal stat-
utes—including consumer-protection laws regulating matters such as telemar-
keting, robocalling, credit reports, debt collection, and the like—may be en-
forced by private parties, however.227 And such statutes often provide for 
remedies such as attorneys’ fees, statutory damages, or punitive damages be-
yond compensatory damages.228 
 
224.  Indeed, at one point, Professor Frost defends nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions by anal-
ogizing them to prophylactic relief. Frost, supra note 23, at 1083. Even prophylactic injunctions, however, 
seek to enforce a plaintiff’s rights by mandating certain conduct that is not otherwise required or prohibiting 
certain conduct that is not otherwise illegal in order to deter violations of those rights, identify hard-to-detect 
violations, or impose standards to help determine what constitutes a violation. See generally Thomas, supra note 
49. A prophylactic injunction does not allow a court to extend an injunction to third-party nonlitigants when 
doing so is not related to protecting a plaintiff’s rights. 
225.  Thomas, supra note 49, at 110–11. 
226.  The nationwide private enforcement injunction is comparable to the famed “fourth box” from 
Judge Guido Calabresi and Professor A. Douglas Melamed’s famed “cathedral model.” Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1116–24 (1972). 
227.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)–(b), 1681o(a) (2012) (creating private rights of action for violations 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (creating a private right of action for violations of the 
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5) (2012) (creating private rights of action 
for telemarketing and robocalling). 
      228.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)–(c), 1681o(a)(2), 1692k(a)(2)(A)–(B), (a)(3); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(3)(B), (c)(5)(B). The availability of statutory damages to plaintiffs who have not suffered concrete 
injuries raises Article III standing concerns under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). See Michael T. 
Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and the Nonfederal Federal Question, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 583, 
589–92 (2018). 
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In such situations, there is no obvious defendant the corporation can sue 
to obtain complete pre-enforcement protection—particularly if the statute al-
lows exclusively for private enforcement. The corporation could not sue either 
the United States or Congress to have the law declared invalid because they are 
protected by sovereign immunity.229 Even if the corporation sought an injunc-
tion or declaratory judgment against the federal official charged with enforcing 
the measure (assuming one existed), a favorable judgment would neither bind 
private right holders as a matter of res judicata nor otherwise preclude them 
from suing the corporation for any violations of the statute.230 And the trial 
court’s ruling would have no precedential effect in any such private litigation, 
especially in other districts and circuits.231 Furthermore, if the government de-
clined to appeal, the corporation would have no way of even attempting to ob-
tain a favorable ruling from a court of appeals or the Supreme Court to obtain 
broader stare decisis protection against private lawsuits. And the statutory rem-
edies may be too severe for the corporation to simply violate the law and adju-
dicate the validity of its conduct after the fact.232 
Another potential option would be for the corporation to seek either an 
injunction or declaratory judgment against a right holder protected by the stat-
ute who would be able to sue the corporation for any violations. In other words, 
rather than violating a federal statute and running the risk of being sued for 
statutory damages, punitive damages, or attorneys’ fees, the corporation could 
seek an advance determination of the statute’s validity or proper interpretation 
by suing a potential future plaintiff. 
Even assuming the corporation were able to overcome justiciability re-
strictions, establish that a live case or controversy exists, and win the case—all 
substantial hurdles—the resulting judgment would be of little use. Again, under 
current law, a district court opinion would have no stare decisis effect, especially 
in other jurisdictions.233 And an injunction234 or declaratory judgment235 would 
not be binding on any other right holders, meaning the corporation would still 
face potentially substantial liability if it violated the law with regard to anyone 
 
229.   Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934) (“The sovereign’s immunity from suit exists 
whatever the character of the proceeding or the source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies . . . to 
those [causes of action] arising from some violation of rights conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution.” 
(citations omitted)). 
230.  See Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961) (“[J]ust as the Government is 
not bound by private antitrust litigation to which it is a stranger, so private parties, similarly situated, are not 
bound by government litigation.” (citing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950); 
United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 116 (D. Del. 1939); United States v. Radio Corp. 
of Am., 3 F. Supp. 23 (D. Del. 1933); United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 73 (S.D.N.Y 
1949); United States v. Loew’s Inc., 136 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)). 
      231.  Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 
232.  See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134–37 (2007). 
233.  Camreta, 563 U.S. at 709 n.7. 
      234.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2) (identifying entities bound by an injunction). 
      235.  See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008). 
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else. Moreover, if the corporation prevailed at the district court level, it would 
have no way to force an appeal to generate a favorable precedent with broader 
stare decisis effect from higher courts. 
To obtain effective protection against an unconstitutional federal legal pro-
vision that creates a private right of action, the corporation would need nation-
wide relief: what we might call a nationwide private enforcement injunction. It 
appears there are two ways a corporation could presently attempt to seek such 
relief, but both are highly problematic and unlikely to succeed. First, the com-
pany could attempt to bring a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to the 
statute against a nationwide defendant class of all similarly situated right hold-
ers.236 Such a nationwide defendant class would raise many of the same con-
cerns as a nationwide plaintiff class. It places a single district court in the posi-
tion of adjudicating the rights of people throughout the nation, including people 
outside of its geographic jurisdiction, whose claims would ordinarily be subject 
to the law of other circuits. The claim would also face serious justiciability con-
cerns because few, if any, members of the putative defendant class will have 
taken any action or advanced a position adverse to the plaintiff.237   
It is also unclear whether a plaintiff may certify a defendant class under 
Rule 23(b)(2) to seek injunctive relief. Rule 23 authorizes courts to certify de-
fendant classes in which one or more named defendants are “sued . . . on behalf 
of” other similarly situated defendants against whom comparable allegations are 
raised.238 Consistent with this provision, the Advisory Committee note accom-
panying the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 expressly recognizes the possibility 
of defendant classes.239 Courts have split, however, on whether a court may 
certify a defendant class for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2).240  Several 
circuits have concluded that only plaintiff classes may be certified under that 
 
      236.  The plaintiff would have to notify the Attorney General about the case, FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1(a)(2), 
and the government would have the right to intervene in the litigation, if it wished, 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a); FED. 
R. CIV. P. 5.1(c). 
237.  This issue arises frequently in the patent context. An entity engaged in activity that might infringe 
another party’s patent cannot seek a declaratory judgment of noninfringement unless the patentee affirma-
tively takes positions or makes threats that contribute to the controversy. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelec-
tronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (suggesting that Article III jurisdiction depends on an 
“affirmative act” by the patentee); see also Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 
1381–84 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (evaluating the patentee’s conduct in determining whether a live controversy existed 
between the parties that would allow the court to exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment suit 
against the patentee). 
238.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
239.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment; see also 7A WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 97, § 1770, at 473 (“Rule 23 does not differentiate on its face between plaintiff and defendant class 
actions.”). 
240.  See 5 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 23.43[5] & nn.37–38 (citing 
cases); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 97, § 1775, at 58 (“Although arguments have been made that certifi-
cation of defendant class suits under Rule 23(b)(2) would be desirable, as well as consistent with the policies 
underlying the rule, the fact remains that the language is clear, and the better view is to restrict its applicability 
to plaintiff classes seeking injunctive relief.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Scott Douglas Miller, Note, Certification of 
Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (1984). 
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provision.241 For all these reasons, it seems unlikely that an entity can success-
fully challenge a federal statute creating a private right of action through a law-
suit for injunctive or declaratory relief against a nationwide defendant class of 
right holders.  
A second alternative, which was recently tried unsuccessfully in the Fifth 
Circuit case Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, would be to leverage a favorable judg-
ment in a lawsuit against the government into a cudgel against private plain-
tiffs.242  In 2014, twenty-one states and more than fifty-five business groups 
sued the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas.243 They argued that the Obama Administration’s reg-
ulations244 implementing the Fair Labor Standards Act’s overtime provisions245 
were invalid. The court entered a preliminary injunction against the regulations, 
declaring, “A nationwide injunction is proper in this case. The Final Rule is 
applicable to all states. Consequently, the scope of the alleged irreparable injury 
extends nationwide. A nationwide injunction protects both employees and em-
ployers from being subject to different . . . exemptions based on location.”246 It 
later granted summary judgment to the business groups, holding that “the De-
partment’s Final Rule . . . is invalid.”247 
While the preliminary injunction was in effect, a New Jersey resident who 
worked at Chipotle filed a putative class action suit against the company in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey for violating the overtime 
regulation.248 Neither the employee nor Chipotle had anything to do with the 
Texas litigation. Nevertheless, Chipotle moved the Texas court to hold the em-
ployee in contempt for violating that court’s preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of the regulation.249 
The district court granted the motion, holding the employee in con-
tempt.250 The court noted that the employee knew about the order when he 
 
      241.  See, e.g., Tilley v. TJX Cos., 345 F.3d 34, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[D]efendant classes generally lie 
outside the contemplation of Rule 23(b)(2).”); Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 
1987) (holding that the “language” and “drafting history” of Rule 23(b)(2) demonstrate that broad defendant 
classes are impermissible); Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that Rule 
23(b)(2) “contemplates certification of a plaintiff class against a single defendant, not the certification of a 
defendant class”); Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854–55 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 
      242.  Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 2019). 
243.  See Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795, 799 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (noting that the 
lawsuits were consolidated), appeal docketed, No. 17-41130 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2017). 
244.  81 FED. REG. 32,391, 32,549–52 (May 23, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 541 (2019)). 
245.  29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012). 
246.  Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2016), stay den’d, 227 F. Supp. 
3d 696 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
247.  Nevada, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 808. 
248.  See Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 714 (E.D. Tex. 2018), rev’d sub nom., 
Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2019). 
249.  Id. at 715. 
250.  Id. at 729. 
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filed the New Jersey lawsuit.251 Although the preliminary injunction enjoined 
only DOL from enforcing the overtime rule, injunctions also apply to nonpar-
ties who are in privity with an enjoined entity.252 The Texas court held that 
DOL had been defending the overtime rule to enforce the rights of people like 
the employee throughout the nation. Consequently, the employee was in privity 
with the Department and subject to the injunction.253 The Texas court com-
mented, “[T]he common knowledge among citizens that the DOL and agencies 
like it represent the public at large explains the dearth of precedent that factually 
paralleled this proceeding.”254 
 The Texas court went on to conclude that the employee’s New Jersey law-
suit for Chipotle’s alleged violations of the overtime rule violated the prelimi-
nary injunction.255 It held the employee and his attorneys in contempt, ordering 
them to withdraw the New Jersey lawsuit and reimburse Chipotle for its attor-
neys’ fees in connection with the contempt motion.256 The court stayed its rul-
ing pending appeal,257 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed it.258   
 The Fifth Circuit correctly declared that, because the employee was “not in 
privity with the DOL and not otherwise bound by the injunction, the district 
court erred in granting Chipotle’s motion for contempt.”259  This case confirms 
that even a favorable judgment against the government invalidating a legal pro-
vision will not preclude private plaintiffs from continuing to sue under it, espe-
cially in other jurisdictions. Without some mechanism akin to a nationwide de-
fendant-class injunction, nothing other than a Supreme Court opinion can 
protect a private party from federal legal provisions that create private rights of 
action. 
Affording district court rulings district- or circuit-wide stare decisis effect 
would reduce some of the risk to regulated entities but not completely solve the 
problem. The corporation would still have to find a defendant (i.e., a right 
holder under the statute) against whom it could assert a ripe, justiciable claim. 
And it would not be able to operate safely on a nationwide basis without secur-
ing victories in multiple jurisdictions. 
 
251.  Id. at 716. 
252.  Id. at 720 (citing Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945)). 
253.  Id. at 725–26. 
254.  Id. at 725. 
255.  Id. at 726. 
256.  Id. at 729. 
257.  Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 4:16-CV-00731, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73790, at *5 (E.D. 
Tex. May 1, 2018).  
258.  Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 2019). 
      259.  Id. at 213. 
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One potentially effective solution, which would require some substantial 
doctrinal shifts, would be to allow a plaintiff to obtain protection against a fed-
eral legal provision (including private causes of action) by bringing a declaratory 
judgment suit against a designated government official in his or her official ca-
pacity, such as the Speaker of the House, Attorney General, or President.260  
Such officials are ultimately responsible, in some sense, for federal legal provi-
sions, including measures they are not empowered to enforce themselves. Alt-
hough this approach would rest upon a legal fiction, it is comparable to the 
other fictions upon which much of modern sovereign immunity doctrine, such 
as Ex parte Young, is premised.261 These suits would also be an easier vehicle for 
generating precedents that could be afforded stare decisis effect because the 
plaintiff would not be singling out an unsuspecting right holder—with whom 
an Article III controversy may not even exist—to sue. Additionally, the federal 
government is much better equipped to defend the constitutionality or proper 
interpretation of federal laws and, in any event, is already entitled to intervene 
in any such challenges brought against private parties.262  
The Court has recognized the importance of providing opportunities for 
pre-enforcement review when a law authorizes potentially severe consequences 
like statutory or punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, or injunctive relief.263 The 
lack of an effective vehicle for bringing pre-enforcement challenges to the va-
lidity or meaning of federal legal provisions that create private rights of action 
is an underexplored topic that requires further careful consideration. 
*** 
Disaggregating the concept of nationwide injunctions can help courts dis-
tinguish the types of orders with nationwide effect that are appropriate for them 
to issue from those that raise serious constitutional, fairness-related, rule-based, 
prudential, and structural concerns. This Article’s proposed taxonomy seeks to 
shift the focus from the geographic applicability of an order to (i) the parties 
whose rights a court seeks to enforce and (ii) whether the case is a class action: 
  
 
260.  Sovereign immunity would bar a suit against the United States or a federal agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 
510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). 
261.  209 U.S. 123 (1908); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) 
(describing Ex parte Young as a “fiction”). 
262.  See supra note 236. 
263.  See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152–53 (1967) (“To require [an entity] to challenge 
these regulations only as a defense to an action brought by the Government might harm them severely and 
unnecessarily.”), superseded on other grounds by statute, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, as 
recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977); cf. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 
118, 129 (2007) (“[W]e did not require, as a prerequisite to testing the validity of the law in a suit for injunction, 
that the plaintiff bet the farm, so to speak, by taking the violative action.”). 
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Private Enforcement Injunction—An entity seeks to preclude all private right hold-
ers throughout the nation from enforcing a challenged legal provision against it. Un-
der current doctrine, there is likely no valid way for a court to issue such orders. 
 
As this taxonomy demonstrates, not all so-called nationwide injunctions 
are the same or subject to the same constraints. Orders of nationwide applica-
bility are appropriate only when necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiffs 
before the court, because either the plaintiffs face potential violations of those 
rights across the nation, or their rights are indivisible from those of third-party 
nonlitigants not before the court. 
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II. POTENTIAL REFORMS 
Both Congress and the courts can prohibit inappropriate nationwide in-
junctions in public law litigation through a variety of reforms. This Part dis-
cusses potential changes to the U.S. Code, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and various judicial doctrines that would ensure lower courts tailor their reme-
dies to enforcing the rights of the plaintiffs before them. 
A. Prohibiting Nationwide Defendant-Oriented Injunctions 
Perhaps the most obvious reform is to expressly prohibit courts from issu-
ing nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions for the reasons discussed 
above.264 Of the various types of orders that might be classified as nationwide 
injunctions, these are the most problematic. Such injunctions may be prohibited 
through any number of mechanisms. Most basically, circuit courts of appeals 
and, ultimately, the Supreme Court can simply hold that such injunctions are 
inappropriate under Article III, Rule 23, or traditional equitable principles.265 
The Court recently had an opportunity to do so in Trump v. Hawaii, the 
Travel Ban Case; Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence forcefully rejected their 
propriety.266 This term, the Supreme Court is hearing consolidated appeals267 
from several courts that approved nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions 
against the Trump Administration’s termination of President Obama’s DACA 
program268—though the litigation focuses on the legality of the termination, 
rather than the proper scope of relief.269  The Seventh Circuit was poised to 
consider the matter en banc in the sanctuary cities litigation but called off its 
hearing when the district court replaced its preliminary injunction with a per-
manent injunction.270 The propriety of nationwide relief in that case remains at 
issue as the Department of Justice appeals the permanent injunction.271 Such 
suits offer the most obvious and immediate method of limiting the scope of 
 
264.  See supra Part I.D. 
265.  See supra notes 148–71 and accompanying text. 
266.  138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
      267.  See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (mem.). 
      268.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511–12 (9th Cir. 
2018) (approving a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction against termination of the DACA program), 
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 243 (D.D.C. 2018) (same), reconsid. 
den’d, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018), stayed in part pending appeal, 321 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(granting also the Government’s motion to clarify), cert. before judgment granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019); Batalla 
Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), cert. before judgment granted sub nom. McAleenan v. 
Vidal, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). 
      269.  See Brief for the Petitioners at I, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Nos. 
18-587, 18-588, & 18-589 (U.S. filed Aug. 19, 2019). 
270.  City of Chicago v. Sessions, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25694, at *6–7, *9 
(7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (per curiam). 
271.  Notice of Appeal, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-05720 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 28, 2018). 
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nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions in public law cases. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court’s rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Govern-
ment in United States v. Mendoza is an important component of the argument 
against nationwide injunctions;272 it would be particularly appropriate for the 
Court itself to address Mendoza’s impact. 
Alternatively, the judiciary likely could resolve the issue through its rule-
making powers. The Rules Enabling Act specifies that rules must be proce-
dural273 and may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”274  Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 65 generally governs the procedures through which 
courts grant injunctive relief. With the exception of the requirement that a plain-
tiff show “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage” to obtain an ex 
parte temporary restraining order,275 Rule 65 does not provide substantive 
standards governing injunctions.276  
Consistent with the Rules Enabling Act’s restrictions, I propose Rule 65(g): 
The court may issue an injunction or similar form of relief to protect or en-
force a person’s rights only if that person is a party to, or real party in interest 
in, the case under Rules 14, 17, 19–20, or 22–25, and that person moves under 
this Rule for injunctive relief. Any injunction or similar form of relief shall be 
tailored to enforcing the rights of the moving party. 
This proposed rule is expressly cast in procedural terms, tying the availability of 
injunctive relief to a party’s involvement in the case as a litigant, whether directly 
or as a member of a class.277  
 
272.  464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
273.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). 
274.  Id. § 2072(b). 
275.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 
276.  Morley, supra note 169, at 252–55. 
277.  The proposed rule complements Rule 65(d)(2)(C), which provides that a third-party nonlitigant 
is bound by an injunction only if it acts “in active concert or participation” with an enjoined party or its agents 
and receives notice of the order. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(C). To the extent the Supreme Court continues to 
accept the validity of Rule 65(d)(2)(C), it supports the notion that the Rules Enabling Act allows the promul-
gation of rules governing an injunction’s applicability beyond the immediate parties to a case. 
    Rule 65(d)(2)(C) raises serious questions under the Rules Enabling Act, however, since the Act authorizes 
the promulgation of only procedural, and not substantive, rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b); see Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (holding that a federal court may not apply a federal rule of procedure if it “trans-
gresses . . . the terms of the Enabling Act”). The Court has explained, “The test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and 
for justly administering remedy and redress . . . .”  Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).  The issue 
of which third-party nonlitigants are bound by an injunction—particularly entities who neither are in privity 
with an enjoined party nor had notice and an opportunity to be heard in the underlying proceedings—seems 
to be a matter of substantive law rather than procedure. The Rule especially appears to regulate substantive 
rights as applied to prophylactic injunctions, which may prohibit third-party nonlitigants from engaging in 
acts that are otherwise legal or require them to perform actions that are not otherwise legally mandated. See 
Thomas, supra note 49, at 322, 326. Thus, Rule 65(d)(2)(C) may violate the Rules Enabling Act. 
    Moreover, if the applicability of injunctions to third-party nonlitigants is a matter of substantive law, then 
a federal court cannot apply the same rule across the board to all cases that come before it. See Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Rather, federal substantive law would govern the scope of injunctive 
relief in cases arising under federal law, while state substantive law would apply in cases arising under state 
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 Addressing the issue of nationwide injunctions through the rulemaking pro-
cess allows broad public participation through the submission of comments to 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.278  It also establishes a consistent nation-
wide standard, rather than leaving room for circuit splits, and ensures the rule 
is crafted outside the context of a particular case, in which the nature of the 
underlying rights or identities of the litigants may color the Court’s considera-
tion of the issue. 
Rather than waiting for the judiciary to address the issue, either through 
precedent or the rulemaking process, Congress itself could simply enact a law 
regulating or prohibiting nationwide injunctions. The U.S. House Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Inter-
net has already held a hearing on the subject279 and reported a bill, the “Injunc-
tive Authority Clarification Act of 2018,” which provides: 
No court of the United States (and no district court of the Virgin Islands, 
Guam, or the Northern Mariana Islands) shall issue an order that purports to 
restrain the enforcement against a non-party of any statute, regulation, order, 
or similar authority, unless the non-party is represented by a party acting in a 
representative capacity pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.280 
 
law. Cf. Morley, supra note 169. Although Rule 65(d)(2)(C) would be unenforceable under either of these 
approaches, very little would actually change. Rule 65(d)(2)(C) codifies the traditional equitable principles that 
would presumptively govern federal-question cases in its absence. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 
9, 14 (1945) (holding that the provision presently codified as Rule 65(d) “is derived from the common-law 
doctrine that . . . defendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and 
abettors, although they were not parties to the original proceeding”); see also Chase Nat’l Bank v. City of 
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436–37 (1934). Thus, even without the rule, federal courts adjudicating federal-ques-
tion cases would continue to presumptively apply injunctions to third parties acting in concert with the de-
fendant or its agents. Likewise, nearly every state in the nation has adopted the same principle as a matter of 
state law, whether as a rule of procedure, see, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); statute, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-11-65 (2019); or judicial precedent, see, e.g., Dalton v. Meister, 267 N.W.2d 326, 330–31 (Wis. 1978). Fed-
eral courts would therefore continue to apply it in diversity cases and other matters arising under state law, 
as well. Of course, the choice between federal and state standards could still be significant to the extent that 
federal and state courts disagree over whether certain interactions between an enjoined party and a third-
party nonlitigant rise to the level of acting in concert with each other. Cf. Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Ele-
ments: Erie and the Standards for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 457, 474–80 (2018) 
(explaining how federal and state courts may interpret and apply principles governing injunctive relief differ-
ently). 
    It does not appear that any Rules Enabling Act challenges have yet been brought against Rule 65(d)(2)(C). 
Even if Rule 65(d)(2)(C) is vulnerable to such a challenge, however, the proposed Rule 65(g) above governing 
the scope of injunctive relief does not give rise to comparable concerns. Whereas Rule 65(d)(2)(C) goes be-
yond the parties before the court to extend an injunction to third-party nonlitigants, the proposed Rule 65(g) 
instead reinforces other rules of civil procedure by confirming that a court may enforce the rights only of the 
litigants before it. 
278.  See 1 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 440.20.40(b) (2011). 
279.  See The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017). 
280.  H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). The bill was reintroduced in the 116th Congress as the In-
junctive Authority Clarification Act of 2019, H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019), and referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. 
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This proposal is a well-crafted solution, though it raises three potential con-
cerns. First, it may be underinclusive because it is tailored only to orders that 
“restrain the enforcement” of legal authorities such as statutes and regula-
tions.281 Courts may issue other types of nationwide injunctions, however, such 
as injunctions requiring government defendants to affirmatively enforce certain 
legal authorities, to construe or enforce legal authorities in a particular manner, 
or to refrain from giving legal effect to other types of official action. For exam-
ple, a nationwide injunction prohibiting the government from complying with 
President Trump’s attempt to rescind the DACA program282 may instead be 
cast as a nationwide injunction affirmatively compelling the government to im-
plement the program. The statute’s phrasing unnecessarily raises questions 
about its scope and creates the opportunity for motivated lower courts to evade 
its restrictions. 
Second, uncertainty may exist about whether third-party nonlitigants are 
“represented by a party acting in a representative capacity pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.”283 The statute would be more effective if Con-
gress adopted a more concrete, specific standard. Finally, the proposal does not 
address the issue of public-interest groups using associational standing as a 
backdoor mechanism for evading limits on nationwide injunctions.284 
To address these concerns, Congress should instead consider the following 
language as a starting point: 
(a) Unless otherwise required by the U.S. Constitution or some other provi-
sion of applicable law, any injunction issued by a U.S. district court shall be 
tailored to enforce only the rights of the moving parties (including real parties 
in interest under Rule 17(b) and members of a class certified under Rule 23) 
and shall not be unnecessarily extended further to enforce the rights of third-
party nonlitigants. 
 
(b) In any case in which a plaintiff entity asserts associational standing, the 
“moving parties” for purposes of Subsection (a) shall be deemed to be that 
entity’s members who had been harmed, or faced an imminent likelihood of 
harm, due to the legal provision or provisions at issue as of the time the court 
issues the injunction. 
Regardless of the phrasing of the proposal, however, the legislative process has 
become so stultified that it seems the least likely route for reform in the fore-
seeable future.285 
 
281.  H.R. 6730 § 2. 
      282.  See supra note 268. 
283.  H.R. 6730 § 2. 
284.  See supra Part I.C. 
      285.  See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 
609 (1983) (“Congress is a reactive body unable to enact legislation until the problem at hand reaches crisis 
proportions.”). 
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B. Limiting the Geographic Scope of Rule 23(b)(2) Plaintiff Classes 
Any attempt to address the issue of nationwide injunctions must likewise 
contend with the proper scope of class actions under Rule 23(b)(2). If courts 
are prevented from issuing nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions in which 
they nullify legal provisions on behalf of all right holders without formally cer-
tifying a plaintiff class, the natural alternative is for district courts to simply 
certify nationwide classes under Rule 23(b)(2) before issuing such injunctions. 
As discussed earlier, virtually any facial challenge to a legal provision, as well as 
any as-applied challenge that relies primarily on generally applicable legal argu-
ments rather than the unusual circumstances of particular litigants, would likely 
satisfy the requirements for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification as a matter of law.286 
And nothing about the process of certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class either provides 
any meaningful benefits to the court, the parties, or the putative class members, 
or helps identify certain cases that would be especially appropriate for nation-
wide relief. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court should reconsider Califano v. Yamisaki, 
which authorized district courts to certify nationwide classes and grant nation-
wide relief in challenges relating to federal legal provisions.287 Indeed, the Court 
subsequently barred litigants from asserting offensive nonmutual collateral es-
toppel against the Government in United States v. Mendoza to protect the gov-
ernment’s power to relitigate important issues in multiple jurisdictions.288 Men-
doza also emphasized the limited powers of the lower federal courts, particularly 
in public law cases, within our hierarchical, decentralized judicial system.289 Cali-
fano minimizes these considerations. 
Alternatively, either the Civil Rules Advisory Committee or Congress could 
tackle the issue through the rulemaking or legislative processes, respectively. 
Rule 23 authorizes federal courts to certify classes; restrictions on their geo-
graphic scope would constitute procedural amendments permitted by the Rules 
Enabling Act.290 And federal law already regulates class actions in various re-
spects.291 I propose the following measure, which could be substantively 
adopted as either a rule or a statute: 
[Rule 23(i) / 28 U.S.C. § 1716] 
Unless otherwise required by the U.S. Constitution or some other provision 
of applicable law, in a lawsuit against a federal agency or a federal official in 
his or her official capacity, when a district court certifies a class pursuant to 
 
286.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
287.  442 U.S. 682, 699–703 (1979). 
288.  464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). 
      289.  Id. 
290.  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
291.  Id. §§ 1711–15. 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) in which the class representative chal-
lenges the validity, proper interpretation, or application of a federal statute, 
regulation, executive order, policy, agency issuance, or other legal provision, 
the class shall be comprised only of members who reside within the federal 
circuit in which the court sits, or who would allegedly suffer adverse conse-
quences from the challenged legal provisions, activities, events, conduct, or 
transactions within that circuit. 
This proposed amendment is expressly limited to public law cases against 
government defendants concerning the validity, proper construction, or appli-
cation of federal enactments to ensure it does not have unexpected adverse 
consequences in purely private disputes. This amendment would resolve the 
longstanding tension between Califano and Mendoza; prevent courts from cir-
cumventing restrictions on nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions; ensure 
percolation of important constitutional and statutory issues across different cir-
cuits; and reinforce both the decentralized, hierarchical structure of the federal 
judiciary, as well as geographic limitations on the legal applicability of lower 
courts’ rulings.  
C. Stare Decisis for District Court Rulings 
The reforms suggested in the previous Parts would greatly limit the power 
of lower courts, particularly district courts, to grant relief in public law cases. 
Taken to the extreme, these proposals would require every right holder 
throughout a state, the nation, or, in some cases, even the world to separately 
challenge an allegedly invalid legal provision, either personally or as part of a 
class, to obtain relief. Such an approach raises substantial practical and fairness 
concerns. 
One of the points that defenders of nationwide injunctions typically over-
look, however, is that injunctions are not courts’ only tools for protecting the 
rights of third-party nonlitigants. When a court interprets a legal provision or 
holds it invalid, its judgment and any injunction are typically accompanied by a 
written opinion. The holdings in such opinions presently have nationwide stare 
decisis effect when issued by the Supreme Court, circuit-wide stare decisis effect 
when issued by a circuit court, and no such effect at all when issued by a district 
court.292 In addition to establishing the law that future courts must apply, circuit 
court and Supreme Court opinions also generally render the law “clearly estab-
lished” for Bivens293 and § 1983294 purposes, meaning government officials may 
be held personally liable for acting contrary to them.295 
 
292.  Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 
293.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
294.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
295.  See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012) (assuming circuit precedent may render the 
law clearly established). 
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The most efficient way to allow third-party nonlitigants to benefit from 
district court rulings is to accord them some degree of stare decisis effect. At a 
minimum, a district court’s rulings could be afforded stare decisis effect 
throughout that district. Alternatively, since all district courts within a circuit 
are engaged in the same activity—attempting to apply the law of the circuit296—
a district court ruling could instead be given circuit-wide stare decisis effect. 
With circuit-wide stare decisis, as few as twelve lawsuits—one in each num-
bered geographic circuit as well as the District of Columbia Circuit—would be 
needed to adjudicate the rights of everyone throughout the nation, regardless 
of whether the cases are appealed. Circuit-wide stare decisis for district court 
rulings would avoid the need to endlessly relitigate the same legal issues and 
allow substantial numbers of third-party nonlitigants to benefit from district 
courts’ public law rulings. At the same time, the geographic limits of this stare 
decisis effect would promote a reasonable amount of relitigation of important 
issues among different circuits and reinforce the limited scope of lower courts’ 
authority.  
 One might object that affording circuit-wide stare decisis effect to district 
court rulings would prevent intracircuit percolation. Courts of appeals would 
be deprived of the opportunity to consider how different district courts have 
addressed an issue and assess the practical consequences of various approaches. 
The Supreme Court, however, would retain its ability to watch issues percolate 
among the circuits and consider the legitimacy and practical effects of various 
circuits’ approaches. Moreover, courts of appeals may not receive the same ben-
efits from a multiplicity of district court rulings that the Supreme Court does 
from the opportunity to consider multiple appellate rulings. Whereas courts of 
appeals are institutionally structured to produce thorough, researched opinions 
on complex questions of law, district courts focus much more on case pro-
cessing and factual development.297 Moreover, because litigants generally may 
appeal to circuit courts as of right298 they frequently adjudicate important issues 
even when only a single district court within their jurisdiction has considered it. 
Extending circuit-wide stare decisis effect to all district court rulings would 
carry other, more substantial drawbacks, however. It would substantially in-
crease the amount of case law each district court must treat as binding and may 
increase the time required to adequately research legal issues, thereby increasing 
litigation costs. Moreover, allowing a district court’s ruling to have the force of 
 
296.  See Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam) (discussing “usual law-of-the-circuit 
procedures”); see also Oladeinde v. Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district 
courts within each circuit must apply “the law of the circuit”). 
      297.  See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991) (contrasting the relative institutional 
advantages of district and circuit courts); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 157–58 (2d ed. 1996). 
298.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a) (2012). 
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law outside its geographic jurisdiction may be inconsistent with Congress’s de-
cision to separate the country into individual judicial districts. And district 
courts may not have the time or institutional capacity to ensure that their opin-
ions are researched comprehensively and crafted precisely enough to constitute 
binding law for other district judges across an entire circuit, particularly when 
trial counsel perform a cursory job of briefing the issues.299 
Whether district court rulings are treated as binding on other district judges 
across the district or circuit, stare decisis is a far more appropriate vehicle than 
injunctions for protecting third-party nonlitigants.300 Unlike nationwide de-
fendant-oriented injunctions, allowing third parties to take advantage of stare 
decisis does not raise Article III concerns about a plaintiff’s standing or the 
scope of the controversy before the court. And all right holders within the dis-
trict or circuit would be subject to the court’s ruling, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff wins or loses. Fairness concerns about asymmetric claim preclusion are 
therefore likewise absent.301 
Stare decisis is even superior to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions as a mechanism 
for extending the consequences of district court rulings beyond the named par-
ties to a case. By its very nature, stare decisis allows all right holders within a 
court’s jurisdiction—known and unknown, present and future—to take ad-
vantage of its ruling. Rule 23(b)(2) classes in public law cases are effectively a 
clumsy, unnecessary, doctrinally problematic means of attempting to achieve 
the same effect. As discussed earlier, their class definitions are often vague and 
overbroad, including unknown, unidentifiable, and even future right holders, 
many of whom lack standing at the time to be included in a federal lawsuit.302 
Neither the court, the named parties, nor the class members obtain any benefit 
from requiring plaintiffs to go through the formality of Rule 23(b)(2) class cer-
tification before a district court’s ruling may protect other right holders within 
its jurisdiction. Granting stare decisis effect to district court rulings, together 
with the stare decisis effect already afforded appellate courts’ rulings, obviates 
the need for such procedural machinations. 
There are at least two major potential objections to relying on stare decisis 
as a replacement for nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions and nationwide 
plaintiff-class injunctions. First, most obviously, the effects of a district court’s 
 
299.  Similar concerns had led courts of appeal to prohibit citations to their unpublished opinions. See 
POSNER, supra note 297, at 165; Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 
184–85 (1999). Litigants are presently permitted to cite unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 2007. 
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a). 
300.  See Bray, supra note 22, at 474 (“Precedent should be the ordinary way one case ripples out to 
others.”); cf. Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 809–10 
(2012) (proposing a more elaborate system of stare decisis for district courts and examining the rationales 
and counterarguments). 
301.  Cf. supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
302.  See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
1 MORLEY 1-65 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019  8:31 PM 
56 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1:1 
ruling would be limited to the district or circuit in which the court sits. As dis-
cussed earlier, however, limiting the effects of lower courts’ rulings—particu-
larly in public law cases involving the validity of congressional or presidential 
action—is consistent with the decentralized, hierarchical structure of the federal 
judicial system.303 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, district and circuit court opinions, 
on their own, provide less protection than temporary restraining orders and 
preliminary injunctions.304  Government agencies and officials cannot be held 
in contempt for acting contrary to a judicial opinion (or even declaratory judg-
ment), even if that opinion is regarded as binding law within the jurisdiction.305  
They are subject to the possibility of civil or criminal contempt only after a 
district court has entered an injunction against them. Thus, even when a court 
rules that certain government conduct is unconstitutional or unauthorized, 
third-party nonlitigants who are not protected by an injunction remain vulner-
able to “fast” violations of their rights, in which there is not time to obtain a 
preventive injunction from a court, and “slow” violations, in which they face 
lengthy and burdensome administrative exhaustion requirements before being 
able to go to court to obtain an injunction.306  To prevent such harms, a court 
may require a case to proceed as a district- or circuit-wide Rule 23(b)(2) class 
action (although still not a nationwide class action307) when the nature of the 
right at issue subjects plaintiffs to such risks. Across the wide run of cases, 
however, stare decisis, rather than injunctive relief, is likely to sufficiently pro-
tect third parties’ rights without disturbing the surrounding fabric of the law. 
D. Other Doctrinal Reforms 
To fully resolve the issue of nationwide injunctions, several other comple-
mentary doctrinal changes are necessary, as well. Most basically, federal agencies 
should engage in intracircuit acquiescence, applying each circuit’s binding prec-
edents to matters that fall within that court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Su-
preme Court, for its part, should reject the “necessity” doctrine, which provides 
that district courts should generally decline to certify class actions in challenges 
to governmental policies or issuances. The Court must likewise repudiate the 
“one good plaintiff” rule, which specifies that so long as any plaintiff in a case 
has standing, a court need not confirm whether the other plaintiffs have stand-
ing, as well. Finally, Congress must be attentive to how venue rules can give 
 
303.  See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
304.  See Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2453, 2492–93 (2014). 
      305.  See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (holding that, in the absence of an injunction, 
noncompliance with a court’s judgment does not subject a party to contempt). 
306.  Morley, supra note 304, at 2458–59. 
307.  See supra Part II.B. 
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effectively nationwide effect to rulings of the U.S. District Court and U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  
1. Intracircuit Acquiescence 
For stare decisis to function effectively as a vehicle for protecting the rights 
of third-party nonlitigants, federal agencies and officials must be willing (or re-
quired) to engage in “intracircuit acquiescence.” Intracircuit acquiescence is an 
agency policy of accepting a circuit court’s ruling as binding law within that 
circuit, or for matters involving right holders within that circuit, even in the 
absence of an injunction expressly ordering the agency to comply.308 Nonac-
quiescence, in contrast, is an agency’s insistence on continuing to apply its own 
regulations, policies, or interpretations of a federal statute, even after a circuit 
court has rejected them, to matters appealable to that court. When an agency 
refuses to acquiesce in a judicial ruling, it typically complies with the court’s 
judgment and provides the relief the court orders for the parties involved in 
that case, but declines to apply that precedent to similarly situated third-party 
nonlitigants.309 
Some scholars have vigorously defended the prerogative of agencies to en-
gage in intracircuit nonacquiescence to courts of appeals’ rulings.310 Essentially 
adopting a strong departmentalist view of constitutional interpretation, these 
authors argue that federal agencies have a strong interest in applying their poli-
cies as uniformly as possible across the nation and maintaining their role as the 
“primary policymakers” as authorized by Congress.311 Rejecting this position, 
others have argued that due process, equal protection, separation-of-powers, 
and fundamental rule-of-law concerns require federal agencies to abide by a 
circuit court’s rulings when dealing with people within that court’s geographic 
jurisdiction.312 
A compelling argument in support of intracircuit acquiescence arises from, 
surprisingly, the Erie doctrine. Erie held that a jurisdiction’s law may be set forth 
either in statutes or court rulings and is equally valid and binding regardless of 
the form it takes.313 When a court reviews an agency action, it is determining 
whether the agency followed the applicable rules of decision, not changing 
 
308.  See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1681 
n.123 (2000). 
309.  Coenen, supra note 26, at 1347–48. 
310.  See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 26, at 683. 
311.  Id. at 759–60. 
312.  Coenen, supra note 26, at 1381–87; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 26, at 821–28. 
313.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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them.314 The endeavor presupposes that the agency and the court are applying 
the same body of law, including binding precedents.  
Moreover, since Erie recognizes judicial precedents as a vehicle for estab-
lishing the law, agencies should not be free to deny claimants’ rights under 
them.315 Thus, even if the Legislative and Executive Branches of the federal 
government are free to adopt their own interpretations of the Constitution or 
statutes for matters exclusively committed to their discretion,316 they should 
conform to the relevant judicial constructions of the law when their conduct is 
subject to judicial review. Adopting a strong norm of intracircuit acquiescence 
to courts of appeals’ rulings would alleviate at least part of the perceived need 
for nationwide injunctions in public law cases. 
2. The Necessity Doctrine 
Circuits that have adopted the “necessity doctrine” should abandon it or, 
at the very least, limit it to cases involving indivisible rights.317 The necessity 
doctrine provides that certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class is unnecessary where an 
injunction issued to an individual plaintiff would have the same effect as a class-
wide injunction.318 Numerous circuits, with the notable exception of the Sev-
enth Circuit,319 have adopted this policy.320 The Sixth Circuit previously em-
braced the necessity doctrine321 but, encouragingly, has more recently expressed 
skepticism about it.322 A few circuits grant district courts discretion to apply the 
 
      314.  See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that, in 
reviewing agency action, a “court must consider whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration 
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment”). 
      315.  Cf. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 26, at 813–15. 
316.  See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see, e.g., Andrew Jackson, 
Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 77–80 (Paul Brest et 
al. eds., 6th ed. 2015). 
317.  See Daniel Tenny, Note, There Is Always a Need: The “Necessity Doctrine” and Class Certification Against 
Government Agencies, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1021, 1040–41 (2005). 
318.  Id. at 1019. 
319.  Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 
(1980). 
320.  See, e.g., Kan. Health Care Ass’n v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1548 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (citing Everhart v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 1532, 1538 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 494 U.S. 
83 (1990)); Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 840 F.2d 162, 168–69 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Galvan v. 
Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973)); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 928 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[S]o 
far as the interests of the putative class members in this type 23(b)(2) class action seeking only injunctive 
relief are concerned, noncertification as a class action is likely to be of no practical consequence.”); see also 
Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972) (“[T]his action should not be maintained as 
a class action [because t]he determination of the constitutional question can be made by the Court . . . regard-
less of whether this action is treated as an individual action or as a class action. No useful purpose would be 
served by permitting this case to proceed as a class action.”), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (2016). 
321.  Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976). 
322.  Hill v. Snyder, 821 F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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doctrine when they conclude that class certification would serve no useful pur-
pose.323 Other circuits apply the doctrine only when the plaintiff seeks to en-
force an indivisible right, for which it is impossible to enforce one person’s 
rights without simultaneously enforcing those of other right holders.324 
The Second Circuit is among the jurisdictions that applies the doctrine 
broadly, holding that class certification is generally unnecessary in constitutional 
challenges to government enactments.325  The court explained,  
 
[W]hen it has been held unconstitutional to deny benefits to 
otherwise qualified persons on the ground that they are members of 
a certain group, the officials have the obligation to cease denying 
those benefits not just to the named plaintiffs but also to all other 
qualified members of the group.326  
 
The court added that ordering such broad “injunctive relief is appropriate 
without the recognition of a formal class,” because “it would be . . . ‘unthinka-
ble’ to permit the officials to ‘insist on other actions being brought.’”327 The 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York implicitly invoked the 
doctrine in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification as moot after 
entering a nationwide defendant-oriented injunction against the Trump Admin-
istration’s attempt to rescind the Obama-era DACA program.328 
This analysis perfectly encapsulates the fundamental flaw with the necessity 
doctrine: it presupposes that district courts may issue nationwide defendant-
oriented injunctions in nonclass cases, even if they involve divisible rights. If 
district courts instead must tailor their relief to the particular plaintiffs in a case, 
however, then the proper scope of an injunction will almost always depend on 
whether a case has been brought solely by individual plaintiffs or instead is cer-
tified as a class action.329 Consequently, if a Supreme Court holding, new stat-
ute, or new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure bars district courts from issuing 
 
323.  See, e.g., Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The 
circumstances in which class-wide relief offers no further benefit [to putative class members], however, will 
be rare, and courts should exercise great caution before denying class certification on that basis.”). 
324.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776, 781 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1996). 
325.  Soto-Lopez, 840 F.2d at 168 (“[R]elief of general application . . . is not limited to class actions. 
When a state statute has been ruled unconstitutional, state actors have an obligation to desist from enforcing 
that statute.”). 
326.  Id. 
327.  Id. at 168–69 (quoting Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 490 F.2d 
387, 399 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
328.  Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), cert. before judgment granted sub 
nom. McAlennan v. Vidal, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). 
329.  A possible exception is when a court issues an injunction to enforce indivisible rights, in which 
upholding a particular plaintiff’s rights requires the concomitant enforcement of third parties’ rights, as well. 
Some courts, however, have expressed skepticism over whether third-party nonlitigants—essentially, third-
party beneficiaries—may enforce injunctions to which they are not parties. See, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that an injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state 
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nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions, they will have to jettison the neces-
sity doctrine as well. 
The necessity doctrine also overlooks two other key distinctions between 
individual suits and class actions. First, class certification affects application of 
the mootness doctrine. In a nonclass suit, if the plaintiff’s claim becomes moot, 
the court generally must dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion330 unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies.331 If a class is cer-
tified, however, the case may proceed even if the plaintiff’s claim is mooted.332 
The Sanchez-Gomez Court unanimously reaffirmed the importance of such pro-
cedural formalities.333 The Court’s attribution of legal significance to class cer-
tification, even in constitutional challenges, is inconsistent with the premise un-
derlying the necessity doctrine that class certification is often irrelevant in such 
cases.334 
Second, the necessity doctrine also ignores class certification’s impact on 
the scope of preclusion. As discussed above, if a government defendant wins a 
case brought by an individual plaintiff, the judgment does not preclude other 
right holders from relitigating the same claim, potentially even in the same cir-
cuit.335 Members of a certified class, in contrast, are bound by the judgment in 
a class action and generally precluded from raising the same claims in subse-
quent litigation.336 A district court’s decision as to whether to certify a class 
determines the preclusive scope of its judgment.337 Thus, the necessity doc-
 
statute did not protect nonparties to the original lawsuit); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 71 (“When an order grants relief 
for a nonparty . . . the procedure for enforcing the order is the same as for a party.”); Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. 
Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Locals 21 & 4, 721 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[I]n limited 
circumstances courts have allowed civil contempt sanctions to be awarded to non-parties where doing so was 
directly necessary to enforce an injunction.”). 
330.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.5.1, at 137–38 (7th ed. 2016). 
331.  Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439–40 (2011) (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 
(1975) (per curiam)) (discussing the exception to the mootness doctrine for claims that are capable of repeti-
tion yet evade review). 
332.  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399–402, 402 n.11 (1975); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
110 n.11 (1975) (noting that a putative class action remains justiciable, even after the named plaintiff’s claim 
becomes moot, if the nature of the issue prevented the court from ruling on the class certification motion in 
time). 
333.  138 S. Ct. 1532, 1536, 1538–39 (2018). 
334.  See Ball v. Wagers, 795 F.2d 579, 581–82 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the district court’s refusal 
to certify a class due to the necessity doctrine was erroneous because, once the plaintiff’s claim became moot, 
the case’s continued justiciability hinged on whether a class had been certified). 
335.  See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008). 
336.  Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1940); see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989), 
superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1074, as 
recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994). 
337.  See Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that, after declining to 
certify a class action at the outset of a case, the district court could not change its mind at the end of the case 
and certify a class in conjunction with its dismissal of the action, because such belated certification would 
preclude subsequent independent litigation by the class members). 
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trine’s foundation is already fundamentally flawed; the elimination of nation-
wide defendant-oriented injunctions would add yet another compelling reason 
to abandon it. 
3. Examining Plaintiffs’ Standing 
An even more broadly accepted doctrine is the notion that, in a multi-plain-
tiff case, a court may proceed to the merits after confirming that at least one 
plaintiff has standing, without separately confirming the standing of each of the 
other plaintiffs, as well.338 Professor Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl recently demon-
strated that this “one-plaintiff rule” is invalid.339  He explains, “Given that judg-
ments operate for and against specific people, it follows that each person in-
voking this judgment-issuing power must have standing.”340  If courts no longer 
issue nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions and instead must tailor each 
injunction to enforcing the rights of the particular plaintiffs before them, it will 
be even more important to determine whether each plaintiff in a case has stand-
ing. Greater precision in crafting relief will require equivalent precision in de-
termining which plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable.341 
4. Reconsidering Federal Venue 
If nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions are eliminated, stare decisis 
will replace injunctive relief as the primary mechanism for giving third-party 
nonlitigants the benefit of favorable court rulings. Congress will therefore have 
to consider whether to amend—and the Supreme Court will have to decide 
whether to reinterpret—the federal venue statute to prevent litigants from using 
the federal district and circuit courts for the District of Columbia to obtain 
effectively nationwide relief. 
Certain types of issues, primarily involving administrative law, are already 
centralized in the D.C. federal courts.342 And plaintiffs are already free to bring 
 
338.  See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 & n.9 (1977) 
(“[W]e have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing . . . . [W]e [therefore] need not 
consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.”); see also 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to 
permit us to consider the petition for review.”). 
339.  Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 485 (2017). 
      340.  Id. at 519. 
      341.  See id. at 512–13 (explaining how the “one plaintiff” rule can make courts more willing to issue 
broad, nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions). Even in cases involving indivisible rights, where the plain-
tiffs’ identities would not affect the scope of the relief, courts should still confirm each plaintiff’s standing to 
ensure it is a proper party because only parties are bound by res judicata, id. at 507. Similarly, only parties are 
entitled to appeal and seek court costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 508–09. It also tends to be easier for them 
to enforce injunctions. Id. at 507 & n.123. 
342.  Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 142–
43 (2013). 
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most other types of public law challenges in those courts, as well. The federal 
venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), provides that, when a plaintiff sues a gov-
ernment agency or official in his or her official capacity, the suit may be filed in 
any district in which the plaintiff resides (if no real property is involved), any 
defendant resides, or “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise 
to the claim occurred.”343  This provision makes venue proper in the District 
of Columbia for most challenges concerning the validity or proper construction 
of federal level provisions “due to legal residence of federal defendants or the 
making of policy decisions there.”344 
If nationwide defendant-oriented injunctions (and nationwide plaintiff-
class injunctions) are eliminated, plaintiffs seeking to nullify federal legal provi-
sions on a nationwide basis are likely to sue in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia as a next-best alternative. If a plaintiff persuades the D.C. 
district court that a provision is invalid (or that it should interpret the provision 
advantageously) and that ruling is given stare decisis effect,345 then any other 
right holder anywhere in the nation would be able to claim the benefit of that 
precedent simply by suing in the same court. 
While the D.C. district court would not be issuing a nationwide injunction, 
its precedents would be applicable to right holders nationwide by virtue of 
§ 1391(e)(1)’s venue provisions. And even if the district court’s rulings are not 
afforded stare decisis effect, the same analysis would apply once the D.C. Cir-
cuit declared a legal provision invalid.346 The D.C. district court would be 
bound to follow that ruling, and § 1391(e)(1) would allow any right holder, an-
ywhere in the nation, to sue there. Conversely, if the D.C. federal courts uphold 
a legal provision’s validity, right holders living in other jurisdictions would retain 
the ability to invoke venue in their home districts (or even some other district, 
if relevant events occurred there) to seek more favorable rulings.347  
Accordingly, courts should consider whether to reinterpret § 1391(e)(1), 
and Congress should assess whether to amend it. They could clarify that the 
“events or omissions giving rise to the claim”348 are deemed to occur where the 
right holder will suffer adverse consequences from the challenged governmen-
tal activity, rather than the location where the government adopted or issued 
the policy. Congress should likewise reconsider laying venue where a federal 
 
343.  28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
      344.  Huddleston, supra note 23, at 248. 
345.  See supra Part II.C. 
346.  The D.C. Circuit’s rulings, of course, have both a horizontal stare decisis effect on subsequent 
panels of the same court, see, e.g., Scomas of Sausalito, LLC v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1147, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 
as well as a vertical stare decisis effect on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, see Michael T. 
Morley, Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
347.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). 
      348.  Id. § 1391(e)(1)(B). 
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agency or official resides349 because that provision is likely to have a similar 
centralizing effect on public law litigation once nationwide injunctions are abol-
ished.   
Spreading constitutional and other challenges concerning federal legal pro-
visions across the various districts in which plaintiffs live or will suffer adverse 
consequences350 would help prevent the D.C. federal courts from imposing 
their views of the Constitution across the nation. Although Congress intention-
ally conferred such nationwide primacy on the D.C. federal courts over admin-
istrative law,351 there is no evidence that Congress intended for them to play a 
comparable role over constitutional law, as well. Once nationwide injunctions 
have been cabined, reforming § 1391(e) would be the next step toward rein-
forcing the decentralized structure of the federal judiciary, in which important 
issues percolate across different circuits and the impact of lower courts’ rulings 
is limited.  
Attorney Kate Huddleston is one of the few scholars who has considered 
the relationship between nationwide injunctions and the federal venue stat-
ute.352 She approaches the issue from a different perspective, however. Hud-
dleston contends that, without nationwide injunctions, only litigants with sub-
stantial resources could afford to invoke § 1391(e)(1) to take advantage of 
favorable precedents in the D.C. federal courts, rather than litigating in their 
home districts.353 Thus, forum shopping would still occur but only for more 
privileged litigants.354 Huddleston contends that nationwide defendant-oriented 
injunctions allow all right holders throughout the nation, regardless of their fi-
nancial resources, to benefit from favorable rulings, particularly those from the 
D.C. federal courts. Amending the federal venue statute to limit the range of 
constitutional challenges that may be brought in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia would largely address these fairness concerns by limiting 




349.  Cf. id. § 1391(e)(1)(A). 
350.  Cf. id. § 1391(e)(1)(B)–(C). 
351.  See Fraser, supra note 342, at 145; John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Compar-
ative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (2010). 
352.  Huddleston, supra note 23, at 252–53. 
353.  Id. at 252 (“Because of venue rules, the absence of formal nationwide injunctions would not 
preclude the functional equivalent of forum shopping in lawsuits over particular federal governmental actions, 
at least for those with the resources and sophisticated legal representation to reach forums with favorable 
judgments and venue based on defendants’ characteristics.”). 
354.  Id. at 253. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Nationwide injunctions have become a ubiquitous and highly controversial 
weapon in the federal judiciary’s remedial arsenal. It is important to distinguish 
among the various types of orders that might be termed “nationwide injunc-
tions” and identify the circumstances under which each is appropriate. This 
Article’s recommended taxonomy355 seeks to reduce confusion, provide a con-
sistent vocabulary, and ensure that the judiciary’s response to each type of order 
is tailored to the unique issues and concerns it raises. 
Federal courts should avoid issuing nationwide defendant-oriented injunc-
tions in which the court completely enjoins a government defendant from en-
forcing a challenged legal provision against any right holder, anywhere in the 
nation, when doing so is unnecessary to enforce the rights of the plaintiffs be-
fore it. Such orders raise serious questions under Article III and Rule 23, give 
rise to unfairly asymmetric preclusive effects, and are inconsistent with both the 
structure of the federal judiciary and the evolution of federal jurisdictional stat-
utes in the twentieth century. They also lead to extreme forum shopping and 
unnecessary emergency appeals. 
At a minimum, if a court wishes to protect the rights of third-party nonlit-
igants, it should certify a plaintiff class under Rule 23(b)(2) and issue an injunc-
tion protecting its members’ rights. Such classes should be limited to right hold-
ers of a particular district or circuit, however. Although a nationwide plaintiff-
class injunction would avoid many of the problems with nationwide defendant-
oriented injunctions, they remain inconsistent with the structure of the federal 
judicial system, allowing lower court judges to give their legal conclusions the 
force of law across the nation, well beyond the bounds of their respective juris-
dictions.  
Such injunctions likewise preclude relitigation of important constitutional 
issues, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Mendoza that a 
district court’s rulings do not preclude the government from relitigating the 
same issues against other litigants in other jurisdictions.356  They also prevent 
intercircuit percolation, depriving the Supreme Court of the opportunity to as-
sess different circuits’ approaches and select the best vehicle in which to address 
controversial issues. Thus, notwithstanding Califano v. Yamasaki,357 district 
courts should generally certify only district- or circuit-wide classes under Rule 
23(b)(2) in public law challenges. 
Because Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements will almost always be virtually auto-
matically satisfied as a matter of law in most challenges to legal provisions, re-
quiring plaintiffs to go through the formality of the class-certification process 
 
355.  See supra Part I. 
356.  464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984). 
357.  442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
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should not impose unreasonable burdens. In the context of a motion for a tem-
porary restraining order or preliminary injunction, which are typically adjudi-
cated before the court certifies a plaintiff class, the court could simply decide 
whether class certification is likely in the course of determining the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success on the merits.358 
More importantly, however, we should stop viewing injunctions as the pri-
mary judicial tool for protecting the rights of third-party nonlitigants. If district 
court rulings are afforded stare decisis effect on either a district- or circuit-wide 
basis, favorable rulings in constitutional and other public law cases can protect 
the rights of third-party nonlitigants in the same way that court of appeals and 
Supreme Court precedents already do. Most constitutional restrictions that 
presently bind government actors are embodied in precedent rather than in-
junctions. Empowering district courts to issue precedential rulings within lim-
ited geographic regions is a simple, elegant solution that offers a different type 
of protection than broad injunctions, yet it avoids the myriad constitutional, 
rule-based, fairness-related, structural, prudential, and other problems with 
most types of nationwide injunctions. 
 
358.  See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
